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Abstract
Recently, vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) has emerged as an excellent candidate to
change the life style of the traveling passengers along the roads and highways in terms of
improving the safety levels and providing a wide range of comfort applications. Due to the
foreseen impact of VANETs on our lives, extensive attentions in industry and academia are
directed towards bringing VANETs into real life and standardizing its network operation.
Unfortunately, the open medium nature of wireless communications and the high-speed
mobility of a large number of vehicles in VANETs pose many challenges that should be
solved before deploying VANETs. It is evident that any malicious behavior of a user, such
as injecting false information, modifying and replaying the disseminated messages, could
be fatal to other legal users. In addition, users show prime interest in protecting their
privacy. The privacy of users must be guaranteed in the sense that the privacy-related
information of a vehicle should be protected to prevent an observer from revealing the
real identities of the users, tracking their locations, and inferring sensitive data. From the
aforementioned discussion, it is clear that security and privacy preservation are among the
critical challenges for the deployment of VANETs. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a
well-recognized solution to secure VANETs. However, the traditional management of PKI
cannot meet the security requirements of VANETs. In addition, some security services
such as location privacy and fast authentication cannot be provided by the traditional
PKI. Consequently, to satisfy the security and privacy requirements, it is prerequisite to
elaborately design an efficient management of PKI and complementary mechanisms for PKI
to achieve security and privacy preservation for practical VANETs. In this thesis, we focus
on developing an efficient certificate management in PKI and designing PKI complementary
mechanisms to provide security and privacy for VANETs. The accomplishments of this
thesis can be briefly summarized as follows.
Firstly, we propose an efficient Distributed Certificate Service (DCS) scheme for vehic-
iii
ular networks. The proposed scheme offers a flexible interoperability for certificate service
in heterogeneous administrative authorities, and an efficient way for any On-Board Units
(OBUs) to update its certificate from the available infrastructure Road-Side Units (RSUs)
in a timely manner. In addition, the DCS scheme introduces an aggregate batch verifica-
tion technique for authenticating certificate-based signatures, which significantly decreases
the verification overhead.
Secondly, we propose an Efficient Decentralized Revocation (EDR) protocol based on
a novel pairing-based threshold scheme and a probabilistic key distribution technique.
Because of the decentralized nature of the EDR protocol, it enables a group of legitimate
vehicles to perform fast revocation of a nearby misbehaving vehicle. Consequently, the EDR
protocol improves the safety levels in VANETs as it diminishes the revocation vulnerability
window existing in the conventional Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
Finally, we propose complementing PKI with group communication to achieve location
privacy and expedite message authentication. In specific, the proposed complemented PKI
features the following. First, it employs a probabilistic key distribution to establish a
shared secret group key between non-revoked OBUs. Second, it uses the shared secret
group key to perform expedite message authentication (EMAP) which replaces the time-
consuming CRL checking process by an efficient revocation checking process. Third, it
uses the shared secret group key to provide novel location privacy preservation through
random encryption periods (REP) which ensures that the requirements to track a vehicle
are always violated. Moreover, in case of revocation an OBU can calculate the new group
key and update its compromised keys even if the OBU missed previous rekeying process.
For each of the aforementioned accomplishments, we conduct security analysis and




Words fall short to express my gratitude and appreciation to my advisor Professor
Xuemin (Sherman) Shen. Your continuous guidance and constructive comments were
always leading my way through this research. I have gained many skills from Professor
Shen including writing papers, problem-solving, giving presentations, and too many things
to mention here. Professor Shen is always my symbol for hard work and excellence. Your
belief in me and continuous support have been a tremendous incentive for completing this
research. It is my honor that I worked under the supervision of Professor Shen.
I would like also to thank and express my appreciation to the examining committee
members: Professor Sagar Naik, Professor Zhou Wang, Professor Liping Fu, and Professor
Weisong Shi. I appreciate their time and effort devoted for reading my Ph.D. thesis and
providing me with their insightful comments and invaluable suggestions, thereby further
improving the quality of my research work.
I would like to thank all the members of the Broadband Communications Research
(BBCR) Group for their support and collaboration. My discussion with Yixin Jiang,
Rongxing Lu, Nizar Alsharif, Xiaodong Lin, Ho Ting Cheng, Chenxi Zhang, and Mohamed
Elsalih was a tremendous resource of knowledge for me. It is a privilege for me to be a
member of the BBCR group and enjoy the friendly working environment in the group.
Also, I would like to thank the ECE administrative and technical staff for their help,
kindness, patience, and cooperation.
Finally, special thanks goes to my beloved wife, Marian, and my kids, Andrew and
Veronica for helping and supporting me to go this far. Marian, I owe you my deepest
gratitude for your endless patience and support that accompanied me along this long
journey. Your words were always supporting and helping me to go through many difficult
times. You are always my strength.
v




List of Tables xii
List of Figures xiv
List of Abbreviations xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Overview of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Network Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Outline of The Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 State of The Art in Security and Privacy in VANETs 11
2.1 Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Anonymous Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.1 Pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.2 Group Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 Hybrid Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
vii
2.4.4 Additional Considerations Related to Authentication . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Location Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.1 Tracking Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.2 Location Privacy Preservation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.1 Centralized Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.2 Decentralized Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 DCS: An Efficient Distributed Certificate Service Scheme for Vehicular
Networks 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.1 Bilinear Pairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 System Design Considerations in the Proposed DCS Scheme . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.1 Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.3 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 The Proposed DCS Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.1 System Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4.2 OBUs Certificates Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3 Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Certificate-Based Message Signature and Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.1 OBU/RSU/CA Message Signature and Verification . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.2 Batch Verification for Messages Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.3 Batch Verification for Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5.4 Batch Verification for Messages Signatures and Certificates . . . . 70
3.6 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
viii
3.7 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.7.1 OBU Certificate Update Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.7.2 Successful Certification Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.7.3 The Required RSUs Density in DCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.7.4 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7.5 OBU Message Signing Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.7.6 Batch Verification Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.7.7 Additional GPS Memory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 EDR: Efficient Decentralized Revocation Protocol for Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks 92
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.2 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.3 Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 The EDR Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.1 System Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3.2 The Revocation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.3 Vehicles Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.1 The Probability of Having at Least One Revocation Secret Key . . 107
4.4.2 Revocation Success Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.3 The Impact of the Number of the Revoked Keys . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.4 Revocation Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 Integrating DCS and EDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
ix
5 Complementing Public Key Infrastructure 123
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2.1 Hash Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2.2 Search Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2.3 Location Privacy Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.3 The Proposed Complemented PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3.2 System Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4 Expedite Message Authentication (EMAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.4.1 Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.5 Achieving Location Privacy Using Random Encryption Period (REP) . . . 135
5.5.1 Random Encryption Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.6 Revocation and Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.7 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.8 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.8.1 Computation Complexity of Revocation Status Checking . . . . . . 146
5.8.2 Authentication Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.8.3 End-to-end delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.8.4 Message Loss Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.8.5 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.8.6 Communication Cost of Updating the Secret Group Key (Kg) . . . 155
5.8.7 Incurred Delay to Obtain the New Secret Group Key (K̃g) . . . . . 158
5.8.8 Anonymity Set Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.9 Complementing DCS with EMAP and REP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
x
6 Conclusions and Future Work 168
6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.2.1 Reputation-Based Scheme for VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.2.2 Privacy-Preservation in Position-Based Routing in VANETs . . . . 171




3.1 Notations for DCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 DCS certificate update cryptography delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3 NS-2 simulation parameters for DCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4 Average certificate update delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Example of the required densityRSU in DCS for vperiod = 1min and S =
60Km/h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.6 RSUj certificate size in DCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7 OBUm certificate size in DCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.8 Signing and verification delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.1 EDR notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2 NS-2 simulation parameters for EDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.1 NS-2 simulation parameters for the proposed complemented PKI . . . . . . 151
5.2 Simulation parameters for REP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
xii
List of Figures
1.1 Examples of safety applications in VANET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 On the fly central certificate update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Tracking attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Random silent periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 The cryptographic MIX-zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Different revocation scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 The proposed DCS hierarchical architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 The relations of different keys among the network entities in the DCS scheme 49
3.3 The network model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 OBU Certificate Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Simulation scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6 Certificate update delay for DCS and ECPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 Certificate update delay for DCS and classical PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.8 Successful certification ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.9 Verification delay comparison between different schemes . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.10 Verification delay of the different batch schemes of DCS . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.11 Comparison between message loss ratio for different schemes . . . . . . . . 91
4.1 The system model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
xiii
4.2 The probability (Px) of having at least one key out of x in the key set of a
vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.3 The revocation success probability Prev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4 The probability that at least half of the revocation secret keys are safe. . . 111
4.5 The revocation success probability with at least half of the revocation secret
keys being safe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6 A city street simulation scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.7 Different revocation scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.8 RSUs connection pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.9 The revocation delay for different revocation scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.1 Hash chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2 The threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.3 The system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4 Authentication delay per message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.5 Total authentication delay vs. the number of the received messages . . . . 149
5.6 A city street simulation scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.7 End-to-end delay vs. OBUs density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.8 Comparison between message loss ratio for different schemes . . . . . . . . 154
5.9 Communication cost of updating Kg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.10 Incurred delay to obtain K̃g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.11 Manhattan road model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.12 The average anonymity set size for highway mobility model . . . . . . . . . 160
5.13 The average anonymity set size for Manhattan mobility model . . . . . . . 161
5.14 The average REP duration for highway mobility model . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.15 The average REP duration for Manhattan mobility model . . . . . . . . . 163
5.16 The impact of REP on the anonymity set size for highway mobility model 164




CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DCS Distributed Certificate Service
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication
ECDLP Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
EDR Efficient Decentralized Revocation
EMAP Expedite Message Authentication
GPS Global Positioning System
HSM Hardware Security Module
KDC Key Distribution Center
MANET Mobile Ad Hoc Network
MA Master Authority
OBU On Board Unit
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PK Public Key







VANET Vehicular Ad Hoc Network




1.1 Overview of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Every year many accidents happen causing injuries and fatalities. For example, the road-
injury statistics in Canada in 1996 indicate that around 230,000 person incurred serious
injuries, and road fatalities were around 3,000 [1]. The traffic statistics are worse in the U.S.
The health care expenses associated with these accidents form a burden on the economy of
any country. These statistics raise the query to achieve better road safety. As a result for
the advances in wireless communications technologies, vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET)
emerged as an excellent candidate to change the life style of the traveling passengers along
the roads and highways in terms of improving the safety levels and providing a wide range
of comfort applications.
Due to the foreseen impact of VANETs on our lives, extensive attentions in industry
and academia are directed towards bringing VANETs into real life and standardizing its
network operation. As a result, IEEE developed the IEEE 1609 Wireless Access in Vehicu-
1
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lar Environments (WAVE) standard for VANETs [2]. Moreover, the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) and IEEE have developed Dedicated Short Range Commu-
nication (DSRC) [3] as the basic vehicular communications technology, where DSRC has
bandwidth of 75 MHz at the frequency range of 5.9 GHz. VANETs consist of network enti-
ties, mainly including vehicles, which is usually called On Board Units (OBUs), and infras-
tructure Roadside Units (RSUs). Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
(V2I) communications are two basic vehicular communication modes, which respectively
allow vehicles to communicate with each other or with the roadside infrastructure.
According to the WAVE standard for VANETs [2], each vehicle will periodically broad-
cast a message over a single hop every 300 msec. The nominal transmission range of each
vehicle is 300 m. When a vehicle receives a message, it takes an action based on the content
of the received message. For example, if a traffic jam warning is received, the vehicle can
select another route to reach its destination. To enable vehicles to exchange messages with
each other or with the RSUs, they should be loaded with the following:
• Wireless communication module for transmitting and receiving messages;
• A set of sensors for collecting information about the neighboring environment, e.g.,
slippery road, icy road, a vehicle ahead, etc;
• A Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver for determining the vehicle’s location;
• On-Board processing Unit (OBU) that processes all the gathered information and
sends messages to its neighboring vehicles; and
• A Hardware Security Module (HSM), which is a tamper-resistant module used to
store the security materials, e.g., secret keys, certificates, etc., of the OBU. The HSM
2
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RSU YIELD Yield Accident ahead. Prepare to take different route
Work zone ahead School zone aheadRSU
RSU
Transmission range of RSUVehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication 
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communication 
Figure 1.1: Examples of safety applications in VANET
in each OBU is responsible for performing all the cryptographic operations such as
signing messages, verifying certificates, keys updating, etc.
VANETs have a wide variety of safety applications. This includes but not limited
to: cooperative driving, collision warning, work zone warning, road feature notification,
lane change assistance, highway merging assistance, etc. Some examples of these safety




The characteristics of VANETs are different from any other networks. Those characteristics
can be summarized as follows [4] [5].
1. Rapid change in topology: Since vehicles are moving with high speeds, the topology
of VANET is prone to frequent and rapid changes.
2. Network subject to fragmentation: When the headway between two vehicles traveling
on the road is greater than the communication range of the vehicles, it is said that
the network is fragmented. Due to the high speed of the vehicles, it is highly likely
that fragmentation occurs in many parts of the network, especially when the density
of the vehicles is low.
3. No significant power and memory constraints: Since the batteries of the vehicles
are continuously charging while the vehicle is moving, nodes (vehicles) in VANET
do not suffer from the conventional power constraints of the hand-held devices in
the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). In addition, vehicles have ample memory
storage compared to the limited memory in the hand-held devices in MANETs.
4. Large scale: VANET constitutes the largest instance of MANETs that the world
have ever seen, where the order of the number of the nodes is in the range of 107.
5. Predictable mobility patterns: A double-edged sword of VANETs is that the paths
a vehicle can take are well-defined by the roads’ boundaries and directions. Conse-
quently, the mobility of vehicles can be expected to a large extent. Such mobility
prediction can be helpful in data dissemination, however, it also can lead to breaching
the privacy of the users as it may facilitate vehicle tracking.
4
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6. Variable network density: The number of vehicles in one area of the road is temporally
changing during the day, e.g., roads in the rush hours are more congested than other
times of the day. Also, at the same time of the day, some areas on the roads get more
congested than other areas subject to the interest of the drivers.
7. Well-defined node locations: A prerequisite for deploying VANETs is to equip each
vehicle with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. Thus, each vehicle has the
ability to get a relatively accurate information about its location. Nodes’ locations
are of particular advantage to data dissemination and routing protocols as well as
safety applications.
1.3 Motivation
On one hand, VANETs will make a revolution in our traditional transportation systems.
On the other hand, the open medium nature of wireless communications and the high-
speed mobility of a large number of vehicles in VANETs pose many challenges that should
be solved before deploying VANETs. It is evident that any malicious behavior of a user,
such as injecting false information, modifying and replaying the disseminated messages,
could be fatal to other legal users. In addition, users show prime interest in protecting
their privacy. The privacy of users must be guaranteed in the sense that the privacy-
related information of a vehicle should be protected to prevent an observer from revealing
the real identities of the users, tracking their locations, and inferring sensitive data [6],[7].
One key factor for increasing the social acceptance of VANETs is to ensure the privacy
preservation in VANETs. From the aforementioned discussion, it is clear that security
and privacy preservation are among the critical challenges for the deployment of VANETs.
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To satisfy the security and privacy requirements, it is prerequisite to elaborately design a
suite of mechanisms to achieve security and privacy preservation for practical VANETs. In
academia, a lot of efforts have been done to provide secure and privacy-preserving vehicular
communications.
A well-recognized solution is to deploy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [8], where each
OBU has a set of authentic certificates. To protect the privacy of users, each OBU should
use a certificate for a short duration and after that it has to replace this certificate, i.e.,
OBUs continuously consume their certificate sets. Eventually, each OBU will need to up-
date its certificates. In classical PKI, any certificate update must be performed through a
central Certification Authority (CA), which sends the updated certificate to the requesting
OBU through the available RSUs on the roads. The centralized certificate update process
in the classical PKI may be impractical in the large scale VANETs due to the following
reasons: (1) Each CA encounters a large number of certificate update requests which can
render the CA a bottle-neck; (2) The certificate update delay is long relative to the short
V2I communication duration between the immobile RSUs and the highly mobile OBUs
during which the new certificate should be delivered to the requesting OBU. The long
certificate update delay is due to the fact that a request submitted by an OBU to an RSU
must be forwarded to the CA, and CA has to send the new certificate to that RSU which
in turn forwards the new certificate to the requesting OBU. Accordingly, the classical PKI
should be pruned or optimized to satisfy the certificate service requirement in vehicular
communication scenarios. To provide a practical certification service for VANETs, it is
required for each OBU to efficiently update its certificate in a timely manner. The cer-
tification service should also be decentralized to enable VANET to efficiently process the
expected large number of certificate update requests. Moreover, to protect the user pri-
vacy, the updated certificates should be anonymous and free from the key escrow issue. In
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addition, an important issue that should be taken into consideration in the employed PKI
is the efficient authentication as each vehicle will receive a large number of messages from
its neighboring vehicles.
Another important issue is the roaming between different domains [9],[10]. The OBUs
should have the capabilities to roam between domains administered by different CAs. The
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard [2] did not consider the
roaming between different domains, and the interopreability between different CAs is still
an open problem that has not been previously tackled in the VANET literature.
Efficient certificate management is essential for reliable and robust operation of any
PKI. A critical part of any certificate management scheme is the revocation of misbe-
having nodes. Certificate revocation can be centralized or decentralized. For centralized
revocation, a central entity, such as the CA, is the only entity in the network that can
take the revocation decision for a certain node. For decentralized revocation, the node
revocation is done by the neighboring nodes of the misbehaving node. In the centralized
revocation, the distribution of CRLs is prone to long delays [11] [12]. Moreover, central-
izing the revocation decision to the CA renders the CA a bottleneck and a single point
of failure. If the revocation process experiences a long delay, the misbehaving vehicle can
harm other vehicles until the revocation process is completed. Consequently, an efficient
decentralized revocation technique is necessary for the reliable operation of VANETs.
According to the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) specifications [3],
each vehicle periodically broadcasts a message every 300 msec. Those messages are not
intended to a specific vehicle, but multicasted to neighboring vehicles on the road. Even
though PKI is employed to secure VANET, the multicasted messages contain critical in-
formation, such as location, speed, and direction of the transmitting vehicle. These critical
information are sent in clear and are not secured by PKI. An adversary can manipulate this
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information to track a vehicle even if anonymous certificates are employed. For example,
an eavesdropper can use the current location of a targeted vehicle and its current speed to
calculate the expected time for receiving another message from the same vehicle at another
location on the road. Even if the targeted vehicle changed its anonymous certificate, the
eavesdropper may still able to track it. Consequently, there is a need to supplement PKI
with a scheme that is capable of preserving the location privacy of the users in VANETs.
1.4 Research Contributions
The research contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows.
• We propose an efficient Distributed Certificate Service (DCS) scheme. The proposed
scheme offers a flexible interoperability for certificate service in heterogeneous ad-
ministrative authorities, and an efficient way for any On-Board Units (OBUs) to
update its certificate from the available infrastructure Road-Side Units (RSUs) in a
timely manner. In addition, the DCS scheme introduces an aggregate batch verifi-
cation technique for authenticating certificate-based signatures, which significantly
decreases the verification overhead. Security analysis and performance evaluation
demonstrate that the DCS scheme can reduce the complexity of certificate man-
agement, and achieve excellent security and efficiency for vehicular communications.
This work is presented in Chapter 3.
• We propose an Efficient Decentralized Revocation (EDR) protocol based on a novel
pairing-based threshold scheme and a probabilistic key distribution technique. Be-
cause of the decentralized nature of the EDR protocol, it enables a group of legitimate
vehicles to perform fast revocation of a nearby misbehaving vehicle. Consequently,
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the EDR protocol improves the safety levels in VANETs as it diminishes the revo-
cation vulnerability window existing in the conventional Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs). By conducting detailed performance evaluation, the EDR protocol is demon-
strated to be reliable, efficient, and scalable. This work is introduced in Chapter 4.
The DCS and EDR schemes can provide the targeted efficient PKI management to
provide most of the security requirements for VANETs.
• We propose complementing PKI with group communication to achieve location pri-
vacy and expedite message authentication. In specific, the proposed complemented
PKI features the following. First, it employs a probabilistic key distribution to es-
tablish a shared secret group key between non-revoked OBUs. Second, it uses the
shared secret group key to perform expedite message authentication (EMAP) which
replaces the time-consuming CRL checking process by an efficient revocation check-
ing process. Third, it uses the shared secret group key to provide novel location
privacy preservation through random encryption periods (REP) which ensures that
the requirements to track a vehicle are always violated. Moreover, in case of revoca-
tion an OBU can calculate the new group key and update its compromised keys even
if the OBU missed previous rekeying process. This work is presented in Chapter 5.
The DCS , EDR, and PKI complementing mechanisms can provide a comprehensive
security and privacy for VANETs.
1.5 Outline of The Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. We present the state of the art in secu-
rity and privacy preservation in VANETs in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 introduces the efficient
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Distributed Certificate Service (DCS) scheme. In Chapter 4, we present the proposed Effi-
cient Decentralized Revocation (EDR) protocol. Chapter 5 introduces the complemented
PKI to achieve expedite message authentication and location privacy. Finally, Chapter 6
concludes the thesis and presents the future work.
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Chapter 2
State of The Art in Security and
Privacy in VANETs
In this Chapter, we present the state of the art in security and privacy preservation in
VANETs. This Chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.1, we illustrate the security
threats to VANETs. The security mechanisms to ensure secure vehicular communications
are detailed in section 2.2. We overview the anonymous authentication, location privacy,
and revocation mechanisms in sections 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, respectively. Finally, we summarize
the Chapter in section 2.7.
2.1 Security Threats
VANET applications are either safety-related or comfort applications which are respectively
related to people’s lives and financial transactions. If vehicular communications are not
secured, a number of attacks can be launched, which may affect the reliability of the system
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and lead to lives or financial losses. Consequently, it is mandatory to study the different
types of attacks in VANETs in order to well-design the adopted security mechanisms
such that they can thwart all the possible attacks and provide reliable and robust services.
Threats can be classified according to the type of the targeted application [13], the targeted
security service [14], or the type of the threat itself [15].
Laurendeau et al. [14] classified the threats in VANETs according to the targeted
security service as follows:
1. Threats to authentication: Authentication is concerned with protecting the network
from malicious users whether internal (legitimate) or external (illegitimate). The
threats to authentication can be summarized as follows.
• Masquerading: For masquerading attack, a malicious node impersonates a le-
gitimate node by fabricating an identity or stealing a working OBU from a
legitimate user. Then, the attacker launches more attacks such as injecting
false messages or blackhole attacks.
• Sybil attack: This attack is one of the serious attacks to VANETs, where a
malicious vehicle uses multiple identities to claim several vehicles at the same
time within an area. As a result, it has a severe impact on location-based
services, and it can even leads to a threat to lives of other drivers.
• Blackhole: For this attack, an insider node deliberately drops all the received
messages which are destined to other nodes, thus, forming a blackhole in the
network. A group of nodes can collude together to partition a segment of the
network by forming a set of blackholes around this segment, thus, preventing
the delivery of any message to any node in this segment.
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• Greyhole: Greyhole attack is a variant of blackhole attack, where an attacker
selectively forwards some messages but not all the messages. This kind of attack
is difficult to detect because it is indistinguishable from normal packet dropping
event due to poor network condition, for example, when the fragmentation of
VANET is frequent.
• Replay attack: An attacker records a message at some time and replays it at a
later time to get specific benefits such as causing a user to be double charged
for the same service.
• GPS Spoofing: An attacker can use GPS satellite simulator to generate fake
GPS signals causing vehicles to get erroneous location information, which can
lead to serious accidents. Another possibility is that if the vehicles use the
spoofed GPS clock to generate the time-stamps attached to the transmitted
messages, replay attacks can be easy to a large degree.
• Broadcast tampering: An attacker can broadcast fake information about the
traffic conditions to cause accidents or let other vehicles clear the way for the
sake of the attacker.
• Transaction tampering: For this attack, an attacker tries to modify or fabricate
a transaction query or reply causing an incorrect charge to the user.
2. Threats to confidentiality: Confidentiality is concerned with preventing unauthorized
nodes from eavesdropping or inferring the data exchanged between legitimate users.
• Eavesdropping: An eavesdropper can listen to the messages transmitted over
the air. Then, the eavesdropper can build a complete profile about how often
and when the services are used by a particular user.
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• Location tracking: In safety applications, each user periodically broadcasts its
location. An attacker can eavesdrop and manipulate these data to track the
user and possibly infer sensitive information about the user such as the user’s
real identity which violates the user’s privacy.
3. Threats to availability: Availability is concerned with making the services offered by
VANET applications always available to legitimate users.
• DoS: An attacker can deliberately flood or jam the communication channel
with falsified data to disrupt the communication between legitimate nodes and
possibly prevent the service altogether.
• Malware: An attacker can insert a malware, e.g., virus, worm, trojan, etc., in the
firmware update messages broadcast by the network. As a result, the malware
could be installed in the operating system of the vehicles or the RSUs, which
can disrupt their performances.
• Spamming: In this attack, an attacker can continuously broadcast spamming
data in an area to make the service (or the application) offered by VANET in
this area experience long delays, hence, degrading the performance of the offered
service.
Raya et al. [13] classified the threats to vehicular networks according to the type of the
targeted application into three main categories:
1. Attacks on safety-related applications: The result of such kind of attacks ranges from
traffic congestion to accidents and losses of lives.
2. Attacks on payment-based applications: Vehicular networks support applications
such as toll collection and location-based services, which include some financial trans-
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actions. This means that this type of applications will be targeted by many attackers.
Attacks on payment-based applications usually results in financial frauds.
3. Attacks on privacy: Vehicular networks can make the tracking of vehicles easy be-
cause vehicles can be tracked from their transmitted messages.
Raya et al. [15] gave a classification of the security threats in vehicular networks according
to the type of the attacks as follows:
1. Jamming: An attacker jam the communication channel to prevent vehicles from
communicating together.
2. Forgery: An attacker can forge a message to cause accidents or to get some rational
benefits. The freshness and correctness of the exchanged messages between vehicles
are very important to ensure that the received messages are not forged.
3. In-transit traffic tampering: The attackers in such kind of attacks deliberately drop,
corrupt, or modify messages.
4. Impersonation: For this attack, the attacker aims to convince other vehicles that he
is a legitimate vehicle. For example, the attacker can claim that he is an emergency
vehicle to make other vehicles yield the road in front of him.
5. Privacy violation: If the attacker can collect enough messages from a vehicle, it may
be easier to gain some knowledge about the personal information of the driver. This
is considered a violation of the privacy of users.
6. On-board tampering: The attacker can tinker with the sources of information in the
vehicle. For example, he can by-pass a sensor or put some ice around the temperature




In order to protect VANETs against the threats mentioned in the previous section, the se-
curity mechanisms employed in VANETs should satisfy the following security requirements
[4] [16] [17] [18]:
1. Authentication: Entity authentication is required to prevent illegitimate users from
injecting bogus messages into the network. Each vehicle in the network should pos-
sess an authentic identity. When a vehicle receives a message, it first checks the
authenticity of the sender’s identity before performing further processing to the re-
ceived message. Besides entity authentication, data authentication is also a concern
to ensure that the contents of the received data is neither altered nor replayed.
2. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is necessary to prevent legitimate users from deny-
ing the transmission or the content of their messages. Users anticipate the network
to provide a high level of liability, where a vehicle involved in a crash should be ef-
ficiently identified. Liability can be achieved by investigating the messages saved in
each vehicle involved in the crash. However, if non-repudiation cannot be guaranteed,
this process will be infeasible.
3. Privacy: Providing privacy is mainly related to preventing the disclosure of the real
identities of the users and their locations information. Privacy can be provided by
introducing identity anonymity such that any observer could neither identify the real
identity nor correlate the real identity with the current location of any user. An
observer is an attacker launching tracking attacks by installing receivers on the roads
to eavesdrop the messages broadcast by the OBUs. By trying to correlate some of
the broadcast certificates to an OBU, the observer may be able to track that OBU.
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4. Access control: Access control is necessary to ensure reliable and secure operation of
the system. Any misbehaving entity should be revoked from the network to protect
the safety of other legitimate entities in the network. Moreover, any actions taken
by that misbehaving entity should be canceled.
5. Data consistency: Data consistency is important requirement for safety applications
to protect the users against malicious insider users. In general, vehicular networks
have honest majority of users. However, if one of the vehicle’s sensors becomes
malfunction, it will start transmitting messages with wrong information. The same
situation applies to legitimate users who have malicious behavior. Such kind of
users can affect the network operation by generating rogue messages. The danger of
these faulty messages is that they have been issued by legitimate users, which means
that they are authentic messages yet containing falsified data. Misinterpreting these
falsified messages as valid ones can lead to harmful actions taken by the vehicles. To
mitigate the effect of such kind of messages, authentic messages received by a vehicle
should be cross-checked with other received messages from other vehicles to ensure
data consistency.
6. Availability: Users may be frustrated if the VANET services become temporarily
unavailable due to attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS). Availability means that
messages not only reach all the targeted recipients but also reach at the correct time.
However, the acceptable latency differs according to the type application. In other
words, VANET applications should be prioritized according to the bounds of the
acceptable delay in each application. Vehicles are typically moving with high speeds,
which means that they cannot be involved in long term communication sessions. This




In this section, we discuss the guidelines of the basic security mechanisms to meet the
security requirements mentioned in the previous section. The security requirements of
the data authentication and non-repudiation can be achieved by using digital signature.
To implement digital signatures, asymmetric cryptography scheme is required, in which
each entity has a public/private key pair. In asymmetric cryptography schemes, an entity
uses its unique private key for generating a unique digital signature for every outgoing
message. When a signed message is received, the recipient uses the public key of the
sender to verify the digital signature of the sender on the message. Successful digital
signature verification implies that the content of the message is not altered, and the sender
is the only one who can generate this message, i.e., achieving data authentication and
non-repudiation. To achieve entity authentication, the public key of each entity must be
authentic and all the entities in the network should be able to validate its authenticity.
From the aforementioned discussion, it is clear that securing VANETs requires Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), where each entity in the network possesses an authentic certificate
generated by a trusted Certification Authority (CA). Eq. (2.1) shows the fundamental
elements in an authentic certificate certi generated by a CA for an entity i, where ID i is
the identity of i, PKi is the public key of i, Vi is the validity period of the certificate certi,
and sigCA(ID i||PKi||Vi) is the signature of the CA, using the CA private key SKCA, on
the concatenation (ID i||PKi||Vi).
certi = (ID i, PKi, Vi, sigCA(ID i||PKi||Vi)) (2.1)
Any entity can verify the certificate certi by verifying the signature sigCA(ID i||
PKi||Vi) using the public key PKCA of the CA, which is known to all the entities in the
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network. The purpose of the certificates generated by the CA is to bind the identity of
the certificate holder to its public key in an authentic way. Any entity in VANETs should
sign any outgoing message M . The message format (msgformat) of an outgoing message
is indicated in Eq. (2.2), where sigi(M) is the signature of i on the message M using the
private key SKi corresponding to the public key PKi included in certi.
msgformat = M ||sigi(M)||certi (2.2)
Any vehicle receiving a message in the format given in Eq. (2.2), first, verifies certi
using the CA public key PKCA to achieve entity authentication. Then, it verifies the
signature sigi(M) using the public key PKi included in the certificate certi of entity i to
achieve data authentication and non-repudiation since entity i is the only entity that can
generate the signature sigi(M) using its private key SKi.
The mechanism that can be used to provide access control in PKI is the revocation of
misbehaving nodes. Revocation can be achieved by employing Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs). A CRL is a list containing the identities of the certificates of the misbehaving
nodes. Before verifying any received message, each node checks whether or not the sender
is included in the up-to-date CRL.
Data consistency can be simply achieved by cross-checking the received messages with
the previously received messages and excluding the anomaly ones. According to availability,
there is no clear mechanism to defend the network against availability attacks, especially
DoS attacks. However, a possible solution is to switch to other communication technologies,
e.g., cellular communications, FM, etc., when a DoS attack is detected.
So far we have discussed the security mechanisms used to meet the VANETs’ security
requirements except for the privacy requirement. In traditional PKI, binding a fixed iden-
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tity of the certificate holder to a fixed public key can lead to a severe violation of the users’
privacy as tracking a user can be trivially performed by linking the unique certificate iden-
tifier included in the broadcast messages by that user. It should be noted that the WAVE
standard [2] details how PKI can be used to provide authentication. However, WAVE does
not mention how privacy preservation can be achieved. Consequently, how can the privacy
of the users be preserved in PKI? One viable solution for preserving the privacy of the users
is to use anonymous authentication, where the authentication of an entity can be verified
without disclosing the real identity of that entity. However, if VANETs offer absolute
privacy preservation for the users, the liability of VANETs will be violated. Consequently,
VANETs should provide conditional privacy preservation such that only a trusted entity is
allowed to reveal the real identity of the users after getting a juridical permission. In the
following sections, we discuss the state of the art for achieving anonymous authentication,
location privacy preservation, and revocation. It should be noted that through the rest of
the chapter the words vehicle, OBU, and node will be used interchangeably.
2.4 Anonymous Authentication
The widely acceptable mechanisms to achieve anonymous authentication are pseudonyms,
group signatures, and hybrid (i.e., using pseudonym and group signatures). In this section,
we discuss the details of these mechanisms indicating the advantages and disadvantages of
each mechanism as follows.
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2.4.1 Pseudonyms
Instead of binding the real identity of the certificate holder to its public key in the certificate
issued by the CA, a pseudonym, i.e., pseudo identity, can replace the real identity of the
certificate holder in the issued certificate as shown in Eq. (2.3), where PIDi is a pseudonym
for entity i.
certi = (PIDi , PKi, Vi, sigCA(PIDi ||PKi||Vi)) (2.3)
The message format in the pseudonym anonymous authentication is indicated in Eq. (2.2).
It should be noted that the words pseudonym and pseudo identity will be used interchange-
ably throughout of rest of the thesis.
Only the CA can relate the authentic pseudonym PIDi to the real identity ID i of the
certificate holder, thus, providing conditional privacy preservation. Each entity periodically
changes the used pseudonym certificate to confuse attackers. The shorter the period during
which a certificate is used the higher the privacy protection. Consequently, vehicles will
consume a large number of certificates in a short period, and they will need to get fresh
certificates. Providing new certificates for the vehicles in VANETs is a very challenging
issue. In addition, the revocation of certificates of the misbehaving vehicles in PKI is
performed using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Since the scale of VANETs is very
large and each vehicle periodically changes its certificate, the total number of the used
certificates in the network will be huge. As a result, the problem of certificate revocation
is another challenge that should be carefully considered when investigating the anonymous
authentication problem in VANETs. The proposed mechanisms in the literature to update
the pseudonym certificates can be classified to either central or distributed mechanisms as
follows.











Figure 2.1: On the fly central certificate update
issue the certificates for the vehicles. The CA can generate the certificates using a
static or on the fly mechanisms as follows.
• Static: In the static mechanism, proposed by Raya et al., the CA loads a huge
number of anonymous certificates in each vehicle during the initial registration
of the vehicle [4]. The number of the loaded certificates should be large enough
to suffice the usage for a long period, e.g., one year. Each vehicle can update
its anonymous certificate set during the annual inspection of the vehicle. The
advantage of this mechanism is its simplicity in generating the pseudonym cer-
tificates for the vehicles since it does not depend on the infrastructure RSUs.
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On the other hand, the disadvantage of this mechanism is the requirement of
huge database at the CA to maintain the relation between the real identity and
pseudonyms for all the vehicles. In addition, the revocation becomes inefficient
since revoking one vehicle implies revoking all the loaded certificates in that
vehicle. Hence, the CRL size becomes very large, which constitutes inefficiency
in terms of the CRL distribution.
• On the fly central certificate update: In this mechanism, a vehicle that needs to
get a new certificate sends a request to the CA via the nearest RSU as shown
in Fig. 2.1. Then, the CA issues a new certificate for that vehicle and returns
it via the same RSU. It should be noted that the RSUs and the CA in one
domain are interconnected through an Ethernet [2] as indicated in Fig. 2.1. In
this mechanism, each vehicle only possesses a few certificates compared to the
static mechanism. The advantage of this method is avoiding the large increase
in the CRL size since revoking one vehicle implies revoking a small number of
certificates. It also should be noted that the certificates with expired validity are
self-revoked and revocation is only needed for certificates with a valid validity
period. The disadvantages of this method are: (1) Each CA encounters a large
number of certificate update requests which can render the CA a bottleneck;
(2) The certificate update delay is long relative to the short V2I communica-
tion duration between the immobile RSUs and the highly mobile OBUs during
which the new certificates should be delivered to the requesting OBU. The long
certificate update delay is due to the fact that a request submitted by an OBU
to an RSU must be forwarded to the CA, and CA has to send the new certifi-
cate to that RSU which in turn forwards the new certificate to the requesting
OBU. It should be noted that this mechanism is the adopted certificate update
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mechanism in the WAVE standard [2].
2. Distributed certificate update: In this mechanism, rather than depending solely
on the CA to update the certificates of the vehicles, the RSUs can be authorized to
update the certificates of the vehicles in a distributed manner. The work done in
chapter 3 falls into this category. The details of this work will not be presented here
to avoid redundancy. The advantages of this mechanism are avoiding the bottleneck
performance in the CA due to its distributed nature, and it is fast in issuing the
certificates for the vehicles since the communication with the CA is avoided. On
the other hand, the disadvantage of this mechanism is that it requires a minimum
number of RSUs to be deployed to perform well.
2.4.2 Group Signatures
Group signature (GS) [19] is one of the widely acceptable PKI techniques for achieving
anonymous authentication. GS allows any group member to sign a message on behalf
of the group using its private key without revealing its identity. Any pair of signatures
generated by the same group member cannot be linked together by any entity except the
trusted group manager (TGM). The TGM is a central trusted entity. The TGM is almost
identical to a CA, however, the TGM does not issue certificates for the nodes but instead
it issues GS private keys (SKGSi ’s) for the group members and a single group public key
(PKG) for all the group members. The message format msgformat of an outgoing message
in the GS schemes is shown in Eq. (2.4).
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msgformat = M ||sigGSi (M), where
sigGSi (M) = {enc(ID),ZKP(SK GSi )}, and
ZKP(.) = f(M)
(2.4)
The group signature sigGSi (M) on a message M consists of two parts [20]: First, an
encrypted identity (enc(ID)) of the signer, where the value of enc(ID) is function in a
random number, i.e., it is different for each signature; Second, a zero knowledge proof
(ZKP(SKGSi )) of the private key SK
GS
i , where the signer proves to the recipient that it
possesses a valid private key (SKGSi ) without revealing any information about that private
key. It should be noted that the zero knowledge proof (ZKP(.)) is function in the under-
lying message M . Any signed message can be verified using the group public key (PKG).
The revocation in GS is performed by distributing Revocation Lists (RLs) containing the
identities of the revoked users. The GS is an excellent way of achieving anonymous au-
thentication as the only identifier in the signature on a message is the encrypted identity
of the signer which is different for each message compared to the pseudonym certificate
mechanism where the same certificate is used for a number of messages. However, the
GS schemes suffer from a large computation overhead in the signature verification process,
which limits the number of certificates that can be verified in a given duration. Lin et
al. [21] proposed a secure and privacy preserving protocol for vehicular communications
(GSIS) by employing the short group signatures [20] and the identity-based signatures [22],
where all the OBUs are members of the same group and each OBU has a unique private
group key used to sign the outgoing messages. It should be noted that in this case there
is no certificates. Then, GSIS eliminates the need for certificates update. A similar ap-
proach to GSIS is proposed in [23]. The advantage of these schemes is the simplicity of the
25
2.4. ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION
revocation process, where each vehicle has only one private key, compared to the usage of
pseudonym certificates, where each vehicle has a set of certificates. In other words, these
schemes use the RL instead of the CRL, where the size of the RL is much smaller than
that of the CRL. The main disadvantage of these schemes is that they inherit the large
computation overhead of GS.
2.4.3 Hybrid Schemes
To overcome the drawback of the large computation overhead of the GS schemes, the hybrid
schemes can be used. The main idea of the hybrid schemes is to use the private keys of
the GS scheme to issue pseudonym certificates for the vehicles. The proposed schemes in
the literature can be classified according to the level at which the GS scheme is used as
follows.
1. At the RSU level: In [24], Lu et al. proposed efficient conditional privacy preser-
vation protocol for secure vehicular communications (ECPP). In ECPP, GS is used
at the RSU level, where all the RSUs in the network form the group members, i.e.,
each RSU has a private group key (SKGSi ). The authentication at the vehicles level
is based on pseudonym certificates. When a vehicle i enters the coverage area of an
RSU j, RSU j may generate a short-lifetime pseudonym certificate for that vehicle i
on the fly. The fundamental elements of the generated short-lifetime certificate are
indicated in Eq. (2.5).
certi = (PIDi , PKi, Vi, sig
GS
j (PIDi ||PKi||Vi)) (2.5)
It should be noted that sigGSj (PIDi ||PKi||Vi) is the group signature of RSU j on
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the pseudonym certificate of vehicle i. Any vehicle receiving the certificate in Eq.
(2.5) can verify it by checking the signature sigGSj (PIDi ||PKi||Vi) using the group
public key PKG . Also, vehicle i will use its secret key to sign the outgoing message
as indicated in Eq. (2.2), where the signature of vehicle i can be verified using its
public key PKi included in the certificate shown in Eq. (2.5). The advantage of
this scheme is the simplifying of the revocation process by employing the RL instead
of the CRL. Since each pseudonym certificate generated by an RSU includes one
group signature, the disadvantage of this scheme is the large computation overhead
in the signature verification process inherited from the GS scheme. Another disad-
vantage is the requirement of a minimum number of deployed RSUs to achieve good
performance.
2. At the OBU level: In [25], Calandriello et al. proposed to use GS at the OBU
level, where all the OBUs in the network form the group members, i.e., each vehicle
has a private group key SKGSi . The private key of each vehicle is not used for signing
outgoing messages as that in GSIS, but instead, it is used for signing a short-lifetime
pseudonym certificate for itself, i.e., the pseudonym certificates are self-generated.
For example, vehicle i can generate a pseudonym certificate for itself as shown in Eq.
(2.6), where sigGSi (PIDi ||PKi||Vi) is the signature of vehicle i on the contents of its
certificate certi using its group private key SK
GS
i .
certi = (PIDi , PKi, Vi, sig
GS
i (PIDi ||PKi||Vi)) (2.6)
Any vehicle receiving the certificate in Eq. (2.6) can verify sigGSi (PIDi ||
PKi||Vi) using the group public key PKG . The generated pseudonym certificates
are used for signing the outgoing messages. The advantage and the disadvantage of
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this scheme are the same as that of ECPP except for the requirement of deploying a
minimum number of RSUs.
2.4.4 Additional Considerations Related to Authentication
There are some issues directly related to anonymous authentication in VANETs that should
be considered as follows.
Enhancing authentication efficiency
The authentication efficiency in VANETs can be enhanced by the following measures.
1. Batch verification
According to the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [3], each OBU
periodically broadcasts a safety beacon message every 100 ∼ 300 msec, where entity
authentication and message integrity can be achieved by verifying the certificate and
digital signature of the sender in the pseudonym and hybrid mechanisms, and only
the digital signature of the sender in case of the GS mechanism. In dense traffic
areas, each OBU will receive a large number of the safety beacon messages in a short
duration, and thus the ability to verify a large number of certificates and/or signatures
in a specific period poses an inevitable challenge to the employed authentication
mechanism. Consequently, batch verification, where a number of messages can be
simultaneously verified, is a good candidate to enhance the authentication efficiency.
There are some works in the literature that consider enhancing the authentication
efficiency via batch verification such as [26] which presents an identity-based batch
verification scheme. In this approach, the authentication of the OBUs is achieved via
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identity-based authentication. The same master secret key is stored in the tamper-
proof device of each OBU. However, tamper-proof devices may have serious flaws
[27], which may jeopardize the network security if only one OBU is compromised.
2. RSU-aided message authentication scheme (RAISE)
In order to alleviate the effect of the heavy computations associated with the asym-
metric cryptography, Zhang et al. [28] proposed RSU-aided message authentication
scheme (RAISE). In RAISE, a vehicle (A) entering the coverage range of an RSU (B)
establishes a connection with that RSU, where RSU B sends to vehicle A a unique
pseudonym and shared symmetric secret key between itself and vehicle A. When
vehicle A broadcasts a message in the coverage range of RSU B, it does not sign
the message but instead it calculates a keyed message authentication code (HMAC)
using the shared secret key sent by RSU B. When this message is received by the
neighboring vehicles, they store this message without verifying it. The only entity
that can verify this message is RSU B using the shared secret key between itself
and vehicle A. Then, RSU B informs all the vehicles in its coverage range that the
message sent by vehicle A is valid. In summary, the authors employed HMAC, which
is very fast and incurs light-weight computation overhead compared to the digital
signature using asymmetric cryptography, to achieve data and entity authentication.
Roaming
An important issue in VANET that is almost overlooked in the literature is the roaming
between areas administered by different authorities. The challenge is how to continuously
provide the necessary security services to an OBU moving from one service area adminis-
tered by a CA to another area administered by a different CA. The conventional solution
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Figure 2.2: Tracking attack scenario
is that an OBU, entering the new service area, has to go to the CA of that service area
to be loaded with the necessary security material for using the security services in this
area. However, users may not be satisfied with such solution and a mechanism to provide
transparent roaming between heterogenous domains should be developed.
2.5 Location Privacy
We have discussed in the previous section the different mechanisms proposed in the litera-
ture that can be used to provide anonymous authentication. The anonymous authentica-
tion can support identity privacy, but does it support location privacy? Before answering
this question, we have to consider what an attacker can do to track a particular vehicle.
In the following subsection, we consider a possible tracking scenario.
2.5.1 Tracking Attack
We consider an external passive global observer, which can overhear and correlate any
message broadcast in clear in the network. The anonymity set is defined as the set of
all possible OBUs which simultaneously change their anonymous certificate between two
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observation points controlled by an attacker [29]. Consider an OBU moving between two
observation points controlled by the global observer as shown in Fig. 5.2 [30]. The ob-
server can track an OBU if two pseudonym certificates can be correctly correlated. This
correlation can be achieved by capturing at least one message at each observation point
from the OBU, while it is moving with the same speed and in the same lane for some dis-
tance between the observation points controlled by the observer. For example, a message
is captured at the first observation point from an OBU moving with speed v, in lane L, and
using pseudonym certificate cert1. Given the speed of the OBU and the distance between
the two observation points, the observer can expect the time to receive a message from
that OBU at the second observation point, say after time t. If a message is captured at the
second observation point after time t from an OBU moving with the same speed v, in lane
L, and using pseudonym certificate cert2, the observer can conclude that cert1 and cert2
belong to the same OBU. Also, if the OBU under attack is the only OBU, which changes
its certificate in the area between the two observation points, i.e., it has anonymity set size
being equal one, the observer can track that OBU even if it changes its speed or lane. It can
be seen from the previous tracking attack that location privacy can be achieved only if the
anonymity set size is greater than one and the OBUs, who changed their certificates, change
their speeds and/or their lane locations. In addition, periodically changing the pseudonym
certificate of each OBU in PKI is insufficient to provide location privacy for VANETs. It is
clear that the previous tracking attack is applicable to the pseudonym certificates and the
hybrid anonymous authentication mechanisms as they depend on the certificates. In ad-
dition, this tracking attack is also applicable to GS anonymous authentication mechanism
as follows: Each group signature contains an encrypted version of the identity of the entity
generating that signature [20]. Although, the identity is encrypted, it still can be used
as an identifier of the message originator, and it can be used to track a particular vehicle
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exactly as described above. It is worth mentioning that the GS mechanism and the hybrid
mechanism which applies GS at the OBU level can provide a higher degree of location pri-
vacy compared to its counterparts. This is because a vehicle employing these techniques
can change the identifying part of its signature for each signed message, thereby, provide
more confusion to the attackers. However, these techniques cannot provide perfect location
privacy as they still subject to the above attack. In addition, changing the identifiers of the
vehicles in each message has a severe impact on the message delivery ratio [31]. According
to [31], a vehicle should use the same identity for periods greater than 30 sec to achieve
satisfactory message delivery ratio. This requirement limits the advantages of employing
the GS schemes for anonymous authentication. From the aforementioned discussion, we
can conclude that the answer to the question: “Does anonymous authentication provide
location privacy?” is no, and anonymous authentication mechanisms should be combined
with other mechanisms to achieve robust location privacy. In the next subsection, we
discuss the different mechanisms proposed in the literature to achieve location privacy.
2.5.2 Location Privacy Preservation Techniques
There are several proposals in the literature addressing the problem of location privacy in
VANETs as follows.
Random silent periods
Sampigethaya et al. [32] proposed to use random silent periods, where each vehicle opt
to remain silent for a random period, to protect the location privacy of the vehicles. The
concept of random silent period is illustrated in Fig. 2.3. The attacker in Fig. 2.3 captures
two messages from vehicles with identifiers x and y, respectively, where the identifier is
32
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN VANETS
Attacker’s first observation pointAttacker’s second observation point Silent periodSilent period
Vehicle with identifier x’
Vehicle with identifier x
Vehicle with identifier y’ Vehicle with identifier yThe capturing range of the observation points
Time t1t2t3t4 t4 > t3 > t2 > t1
Figure 2.3: Random silent periods
either a pseudonym or the encrypted identity in the GS schemes. After that, vehicles x
and y opt to remain silent for random periods as indicated in Fig. 2.3. Then, vehicles x
and y change their identifiers to x′ and y′, respectively. The vehicles x′ and y′ will not
transmit messages until the end of the silent periods. When the vehicle y′ broadcasts a
message, the broadcast message will be captured in the second observation point of the
attacker, however, the attacker will be confused whether the identifier y′ belongs to either
the owner of the old identifier x or y as the attacker did not receive a message from the
vehicle x′ since the vehicle x′ remains silent. Hence, random silent periods improve the
location privacy level. It can be seen that the benefits of the random silent period in the
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safety applications are limited as the vehicles have to transmit safety beacon messages
every 100 ∼ 300 msec. As a result, the maximum silent period is limited to the duration
between the broadcast of the safety beacon messages.
To further extend the period during which a vehicle can remain silent, random silent
periods can be combined with group communications for VANETs applications excluding
safety-related applications. Each group of neighboring vehicles forms a communication
group, where the group leader acts as a proxy to all the group members. Combining
group communications and random silent periods reduces the number of messages broad-
cast by the vehicles, hence, increasing the silent period and reducing the probability of
being tracked. During the formation of a new group, there is a need to contact with a
central registration authority. Hence, the proposed technique requires an online registra-
tion authority. Such requirement may not be feasible in a large scale network like VANET.
In addition, when a vehicle updates its pseudonym, it has to leave the group and send a
request to the group leader to rejoin the group. This may cause a large number of joining
requests.
Cryptographic MIX-zones (CMIXes)
Freudiger et al. [33] used Cryptographic MIX-zones (CMIXes) at selected road intersections
to provide location privacy. In CMIX, an RSU at an intersection securely provides a
symmetric key to any approaching vehicle to establish what is called mix zone. All the
data exchanged in the mix zones is encrypted by that symmetric key. In addition, all
the vehicles in the mix zone are forced to change their anonymous certificates. As a
result of the forced certificate change and the random direction change of each vehicle
at road intersections, an attacker on the roadside cannot link a certificate to a particular
vehicle, hence, providing location privacy. The concept of CMIXes is illustrated in Fig.
34
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN VANETS
RSU
All the communications in this range are encrypted. Also, all the vehicles in this range are forced to change their certificates(CMIX zone) The communication range of the RSU
Figure 2.4: The cryptographic MIX-zones
2.4. The accumulation of CMIXes throughout the vehicular network forms what is called
mix-network, which maximizes the degree of the location privacy.
2.6 Revocation
Revocation is the basic mechanism to revoke misbehaving vehicles. Revocation can be
classified into centralized and decentralized revocation according to the authority taking the
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Figure 2.5: Different revocation scenarios
2.6.1 Centralized Revocation
For centralized revocation, a central entity, such as the CA, is the only entity in the network
that can take the revocation decision for a certain node. The different mechanisms of
centralized revocation in VANETs are discussed below.
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CRL/RL
A CRL/RL is a list containing the identities (or pseudonyms) of the revoked vehicles.
CRLs are used in the conventional PKI, while RLs are used mainly with GS schemes. In
general, the size of a CRL is larger than that of an RL as the CRL will usually contain
more than one certificate for each revoked vehicle, while RL contains only one entry for
each revoked vehicle. According to the WAVE standard [2], vehicular networks depend
on CRLs/RLs to achieve revocation. In such case, to revoke a vehicle, a CRL/RL has
to be issued by the CA and broadcast by the infrastructure RSUs. The network scale of
VANETs is expected to be very large. Hence, the distribution of CRLs/RLss is prone to
long delays [11] [12]. Moreover, centralizing the revocation decision to the CA renders the
CA a bottleneck.
A centralized CRL/RL revocation scenario is shown in Fig. 2.5, where vehicle u is
misbehaving, and vehicle v collects enough evidences to accuse vehicle u as a misbehaving
vehicle. Hence, vehicle v sends a revocation request to the CA via the nearest RSU. After
the request reaches the nearest RSU, the request will be forwarded through the RSUs’
Ethernet to the CA. When the revocation request reaches the CA, it verifies the request
and the evidences, and generates a new signed CRL/RL. Based on the severeness of the
misbehavior, the CA may include all certificates of the misbehaving vehicle in the CRL/RL.
Then, the CA broadcasts the generated CRL/RL via the infrastructure RSUs.
In VANETs, the most important issue in any revocation method is the delay of deliver-
ing the revocation message to the neighboring vehicles of a misbehaving vehicle to prevent
that misbehaving vehicle from jeopardizing the safety of its neighbors.
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Revocation Using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists
(RC2RL) and Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD)
Raya et al. [34] proposed two centralized revocation techniques of a node by the CA:
(1) RC2RL (Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists), where the tradi-
tional CRLs issued by the CA are adopted. However, a CRL is compressed using Bloom
filters prior to its broadcasting. The main limitation of RC2RL is that the Bloom filter
is lossy, which means that an innocent vehicle may falsely considered as a misbehaving
one. (2) RTPD (Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device), which is used in case that all
the certificates of a vehicle are to be revoked. In such case, the CA sends a message to
the tamper-proof device used to perform all the security functions, e.g., signing outgoing
messages, in the designated vehicle informing it to stop all the security functions.
Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) and Local Eviction of Attackers by Vot-
ing Evaluators (LEAVE)
Raya et al. [35] proposed Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) and Local Eviction of
Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE). MDS and LEAVE can be used to isolate mis-
behaving nodes before the revocation data from CA is available to all vehicles. In MDS,
the misbehavior that can be identified by monitoring specific parameters of a node, and
data anomalies that do not follow any known pattern are distinguished. In LEAVE, a
group of neighboring vehicles perform a voting on the misbehavior of a specific vehicle. If
the accumulation of the votes exceeds a predefined threshold, a warning message is broad-
cast to the neighboring vehicles informing them to ignore all the messages transmitted by
the misbehaving vehicle. In this way, the neighbors of a misbehaving vehicle can quaran-
tine the misbehaving vehicle until a centralized revocation is issued by the CA. Although
38
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN VANETS
this method is decentralized in quarantining misbehaving vehicles, it makes the revocation
decision centralized by the CA, which may render the CA a bottleneck.
2.6.2 Decentralized Revocation
For decentralized revocation, the certificate revocation of a misbehaving node is done by
the neighboring nodes of the misbehaving node or the certificate is self-revoked due to its
expiry. Some works in the literature addressed the decentralized revocation in VANETs as
follows.
Short-Lifetime Certificates
Revocation can also be achieved by relying on certificates with short-lifetimes, where a
certificate is automatically revoked after its lifetime expires. An Example of such systems
is the ECPP [24] discussed previously. In this scheme, a vehicle gets a number of certificates
from an RSU sufficient to protect its privacy until it meets another RSU on its way. If
the number of the generated certificates per vehicle is one, then, the certificates will be
self-revoked after its lifetime expires, and there is no need for other revocation techniques.
However, if the number of the generated certificates is more than one, then, it may be
necessary to employ CRL to revoke the generated certificates for the misbehaving vehicles





In this Chapter, we have demonstrated that security is vital for the operation of VANETs,
where we have surveyed the different security aspects in VANETs. We have identified
the challenges for securing VANETs by discussing security threats and requirements in
VANETs. Moreover, we have detailed the necessary security mechanisms to achieve anony-
mous authentication and location privacy for preserving the users’ privacy in VANETs.
40
Chapter 3
DCS: An Efficient Distributed
Certificate Service Scheme for
Vehicular Networks
In this Chapter, we propose an efficient Distributed Certificate Service (DCS) scheme for
vehicular networks. The proposed scheme offers a flexible interoperability for certificate
service in heterogeneous administrative authorities, and an efficient way for any On-Board
Units (OBUs) to update its certificate from the available infrastructure Road-Side Units
(RSUs) in a timely manner. In addition, the DCS scheme introduces an aggregate batch
verification technique for authenticating certificate-based signatures, which significantly
decreases the verification overhead. Security analysis and performance evaluation demon-
strate that the DCS scheme can reduce the complexity of certificate management, and




As discussed in Chapter 2, in order to provide a practical certification service for VANETs,
it is required for each OBU to efficiently update its certificate in a timely manner. The
certification service should also be decentralized to enable VANET to efficiently process
the expected large number of certificate update requests. Moreover, to protect the user
privacy, the updated certificates should be anonymous and free from the key escrow issue.
Another important issue is the roaming between different domains [9],[10]. The OBUs
should have the capabilities to roam between domains administered by different CAs. The
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard [2] did not consider the
roaming between different domains, and the interopreability between different CAs is still
an open problem that has not been previously tackled in the VANET literature.
According to the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [3], which is part
of the WAVE standard, each OBU in VANETs periodically broadcasts a message every
300 msec, where entity authentication and message integrity can be achieved by verifying
the certificate and digital signature of the sender. In dense traffic areas, each OBU will
receive a large number of messages in a short duration, and thus the ability to verify a large
number of certificates and signatures in a specific period poses an inevitable challenge to
the authentication technique.
To address the aforesaid security and performance issues, we introduce an efficient
distributed certificate service (DCS) scheme for vehicular communications, which features
the following properties.
1. Scalability: The DCS scheme is constructed in a hierarchical way, which enables any
OBU to efficiently update its certificate from the available RSUs in a timely manner.
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Thus, the DCS scheme offers a distributed certification service. The DCS scheme also
offers a flexible inter-operability between different administrative authorities, and it
enables OBUs certificates to be free from the key escrow. All such policies efficiently
enhance the system scalability, especially when it is deployed in a large-scale and
heterogeneous vehicular networks.
2. Efficiency: Considering the requirement for each entity to verify a large number of
messages in a timely manner, DCS introduces an efficient batch verification technique,
which enables any entity to simultaneously verify a mass of signatures and certificates.
Thus, the DCS scheme significantly decreases the verification overhead.
Therefore, the DCS scheme can meet the security and efficiency requirements for cer-
tificate service in vehicular communications.
Our contribution in this Chapter is proposing an efficient Distributed Certificate Service
(DCS) scheme which enables an OBU to update its certificate from any RSU no matter
whether the RSU is located in the domain in which the OBU was originally registered or
not. Consequently, an OBU is free to roam between domains administered by different
authorities. Also, the DCS scheme considers batch verification of certificates and messages
signatures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach to address the roaming
between different domains in VANETs. Also, the DCS scheme is the first to consider the
integration between distributed certificate generation through RSUs and efficient message
authentication using batch verification.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, the preliminaries
are discussed. The system design considerations in the proposed DCS scheme is inves-
tigated in section 3.3. The proposed DCS scheme is introduced in section 3.4. Section
3.5 introduces an efficient batch verification technique for authenticating certificate-based
43
3.2. PRELIMINARIES
message signatures. Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 respectively present the security analysis
and performance evaluation for the proposed DCS scheme, followed by the summary in
section 3.8.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the bilinear pairings. The notations used throughout the
Chapter are given in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Bilinear Pairing
The bilinear pairing [22] is the foundation of the proposed DCS scheme. Let G1 denote an
additive group of prime order q, and G2 a multiplicative group of the same order. Let P
be a generator of G1, and ê : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear mapping with the following
properties:
1. Bilinear: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab, for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈R Zq.
2. Non-degeneracy: ê(P,Q) 6= 1G2 .
3. Symmetric: ê(P,Q) = ê(Q,P ), for all P,Q ∈ G1.
4. Admissible: the map ê is efficiently computable.
The bilinear map e can be implemented using the Weil [36] and Tate [37] pairings on
elliptic curves. We consider the implementation of Tate pairing on an MNT curve [38] with
embedding degree 6, where G1 is represented by 161 bits, and the order q is represented
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Table 3.1: Notations for DCS
Symbol Notation
CAi, CAw two arbitrary CAs
RSUj, RSUl two arbitrary RSUs
OBUm, OBUn two arbitrary OBUs
s master secret key of MA for secret key generation
α partial secret signing-key for signing RSU certificates
γ partial secret signing-key for signing OBU certificates
P◦ public key used to verify signatures on any message
Sαi CAi secret key to sign RSU certificates
Pα public key used to verify RSU certificates
Sγji RSUj secret key, generated by CAi,
to sign OBU certificates
Pγ public key used to verify OBU certificates
Pµ public key used to verify any certificate
PKi public key for CAi
SKi secret key for CAi
PKji RSUj public key generated by CAi
SKji RSUj secret key generated by CAi
certRSUji certificate for RSUj generated by CAi
PKmji OBUm public key generated by RSUj using PKji
SKmji OBUm secret key generated by RSUj using SKji
vepriod OBU certificate validity period
certOBUmji OBUm certificate generated by RSUj using Sγji
tstamp time stamp
H1 hash function such that {0, 1}∗ ∈ G∗1
H2 hash function such that {0, 1}∗ ∈ Z∗q
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by 160 bits. The group order of G1 is defined as the number of the points on the employed
elliptic curve. For an MNT elliptic curve with embedding degree 6 and the order q is
represented by 160 bits, the group order of G1 is 4.5× 1030 1, which qualifies the bilinear
pairing as a practical choice for securing the large scale VANETs.
The security of the proposed scheme depends on solving the following hard computa-
tional problems:
• Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): Given a point P of
order q on an elliptic curve, and a point Q on the same curve. The ECDLP problem
[40] is to determine the integer l, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1, such that Q = lP .
• Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH): For two unknowns a, b ∈ Z∗p,
the CDH problem [41] is given aP, bP ∈ G1, compute abP ∈ G1.
3.3 System Design Considerations in the Proposed
DCS Scheme
In this section, we discuss the security objectives, system architecture, and network model
of the proposed DCS scheme.
3.3.1 Security Objectives
In the DCS scheme, we aim to achieve the following security objectives.
1This result is obtained using MIRACL library [39].
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1. Authentication: Entity authentication is required to prevent illegitimate users from
injecting bogus messages into the network. Each vehicle in the network should pos-
sess an authentic identity. When a vehicle receives a message, it first checks the
authenticity of the sender identity before performing further processing to the re-
ceived message. Besides entity authentication, data authentication is a concern to
ensure that the contents of the received data is neither altered nor replayed.
2. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is necessary to prevent legitimate users from deny-
ing the transmission or the content of their messages. Users anticipate the network
to provide a high level of liability, where a vehicle involved in a crash should be ef-
ficiently identified. Liability can be achieved by investigating the messages saved in
each vehicle involved in the crash. However, if non-repudiation cannot be guaranteed,
this process will be trivial.
3. Privacy: Providing privacy is mainly related to preventing the disclosure of the real
identity of the users and their locations information. Privacy can be provided by
introducing identity anonymity such that any observer could neither identify the real
identity nor correlate the real identity with the current location of any user. An
observer is an attacker launching tracking attacks by installing receivers on the roads
to eavesdrop the messages broadcast by the OBUs. By trying to correlate some of
the broadcast certificates to an OBU, the observer may be able to track that OBU.
4. Transparent roaming: Users will not be satisfied if upon roaming between different
network domains, they have to go to a central location to upload new security mate-
rials, e.g., keys, certificates, etc., to be able to use the VANET services. Transparent
roaming is needed to ensure seamless operation of the OBUs in VANETs.
5. Access control: Access control is necessary to ensure reliable and secure operation of
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OBUm
RSU RSURSUj CARSU RSU CAw
OBUn
RSU RSURSUl
MA: Master Authority CA: Certification AuthorityRSU: RoadSide Unit OBU: On Board Unit
Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4
Figure 3.1: The proposed DCS hierarchical architecture
the system. Any misbehaving entity should be revoked from the network to protect
the safety of other legitimate entities in the network. Moreover, any actions taken
by that misbehaving entity should be canceled.
3.3.2 Architecture
The DCS hierarchical architecture, shown in Fig. 3.1, consists of four levels: the Master
Authority (MA), which is the root of the system, is located at level 1; the Certification
Authorities (CAs) are located at level 2; the Road Side Units (RSUs) and the On-Board
Units (OBUs) are located at level 3 and level 4, respectively. In this architecture, entity
authentication for RSUs and OBUs is achieved using certificate-based authentication, while
that for CAs is achieved using identity-based cryptography [22].
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Certificate signing keys
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Figure 3.2: The relations of different keys among the network entities in the DCS scheme
Basic Operation of the DCS Scheme
The basic operation of the DCS scheme is as follows.
• The MA is in charge of generating public verification keys for verifying any RSU/OBU
certificate. It also generates a public/private key pair for each CA, for signing the
outgoing messages and verifying the incoming messages. Moreover, it generates two
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secret certificate-signing keys for each CA;
• A CA uses the first certificate-signing keys, issued by the MA, to sign a certificate
set for each RSU in its coverage area. Each certificate in the RSU certificate set is
shared among a group of RSUs. The CA uses the second certificate-signing key as a
partial signing key to generate secret OBU-certificate-signing keys for each RSU;
• An RSU uses the OBU-certificate-signing key to generate short lifetime anonymous
certificates for any OBU. The public verification keys can be used by any entity to
verify the certificate of any OBU or RSU regardless of the issuer of that certificate.
In this way, any OBU can roam transparently between the coverage areas of differ-
ent CAs. The certificate generation in DCS is derived from the signature schemes
proposed in [42], [43].
Fig. 3.2 shows the relations of different keys among the network entities in the DCS
scheme.
It should be noted that the hierarchical architecture and the basic operation of DCS
conform with that of the WAVE standard as follows. The Wave standard considers a root
CA, which is responsible only for authorizing other non-root CAs. The function of the
root CA in the Wave standard is comparable to that of the MA in the DCS scheme. The
functions of the non-root CAs, RSUs, and OBUs in the WAVE standard and the DCS
scheme are similar. Consequently, DCS adopts a realistic hierarchical architecture which
conforms to the current standard of VANET.
3.3.3 Network Model
As shown in Fig. 3.3, the network model under consideration consists of the followings.
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EthernetRoadside Unit (RSU)vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication
On-Board unit(OBU)
Ethernet
Master Authority (MA)CAw Certification Authority (CAi) vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)communicationDomain of CAw Domain of CAi
RSUl RSUjOBUn OBUmRSU1
Figure 3.3: The network model
• A Master Authority (MA), which is the highest level in the system and is trustable
by all the network entities. The MA has sufficient physical security measures such
that it cannot be compromised irrespective of the capabilities of an attacker;
• Certification Authorities (CAs). Each CA is responsible for generating initial certifi-
cates for the RSUs and OBUs in its domain. The CAs are connected directly to the
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MA. Each CA is physically secure and cannot be compromised;
• Road-Side Units (RSUs), which are fixed units distributed in the network. RSUs
in one domain are connected via Ethernet to the CA responsible for that domain.
Also, an RSUj at the border of one domain is connected to the nearest RSUl in an
adjacent domain. These connections are required to check the revocation status of
an OBU roaming between two adjacent domains. Moreover, RSUs are responsible
for updating the certificates of the OBUs;
• On-Board Units (OBUs), which can communicate either with other OBUs through
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications or with the infrastructure RSUs through
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications. Each OBU is equipped with a
Global Positioning Service (GPS) receiver which contains the geographical coordi-
nates of the RSUs. It should be noted that a GPS receiver is necessary for the
operation of an OBU in VANETs according to the WAVE standard [2];
• According to the WAVE standard, each network entity is equipped with a tamper-
resistant Hardware Security Module (HSM) to store its security materials, e.g., secret
keys, certificates, etc.
3.4 The Proposed DCS Scheme
In this section, the proposed DCS scheme is presented in detail including the system
initialization, certificate issue, certificate update, and certificate revocation.
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3.4.1 System Initialization
The initialization stage in the DCS scheme consists of two phases: (1) Phase I which is
performed by the MA to generate the security keys necessary for the operation of the DCS
scheme, and to upload the necessary security keys in the tamper-resistant HSM of each CA;
(2) Phase II which is performed by each CA to upload the required security materials, e.g.,
keys, certificates, etc., in the tamper-resistant HSM of each OBU and RSU in its domain.
It should be noted that both phases of the initialization stage are performed during the
registration of CAs with MA in phase I, and RSUs and OBUs with a CA in phase II. In
other words, both phases of the initialization stage are performed before triggering any of
the VANET services or applications. The details of each phase are as follows.
Algorithm 1 Phase I
Require: IDCAi
1: Select a random number s ∈ Z∗q as the master key, . this is part of each entity secret
key
and set P◦ = sP
2: Select random numbers α, γ ∈ Z∗q, and . these are the master signing keys
set Pα = αP, Pγ = γP
3: Select a random number µ ∈ Z∗q, and
set Pµ = µP ; . general verification public key
4: Select a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1
5: Select a hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
6: for all CAi with identity IDCAi do
7: Set PKi = Qi = H1(IDCAi) ∈ G∗1, . this is CAi public key
SKi = sQi, . this is CAi secret key
Sαi = αQi, and . this is CAi certificate-signing key
Sγi = γQi . this is CAi certificate-signing key
8: Upload SKi, Sαi, Sγi, P, P◦, Pα, Pγ, Pµ, H1, and H2 in CAi
9: end for
53
3.4. THE PROPOSED DCS SCHEME
Phase I
The MA executes Algorithm 1 to generate the necessary secret and public keys for the
operation of the DCS scheme, and to upload the primary security materials in each CA.
It should be noted that the key s is the master secret key, and it will be part of the
secret key of each entity. Also, the secret keys α and γ are master signing keys, and they
will be parts of each signature on the certificates of the RSUs and OBUs, respectively.
Moreover, P◦, Pα, Pγ, and Pµ are public verification keys, which can be used by any entity
in the network to verify any RSU/OBU certificate. In addition, the public key of any CAi
is the hash of its identity IDCAi .
By the end of Algorithm 1, each CA will have the security materials required to execute
phase II.
Phase II
In this phase, each CAi runs Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 to respectively initialize each
RSUj and OBUm in its domain by uploading them with the necessary security materials
for their operation in VANETs as follows.
RSU initialization
Each CAi executes Algorithm 2, to upload each RSUj with a certificate certRSUji , secret
OBU-certificate-signing key Sγji which will be used later by RSUj to issue
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Algorithm 2 Phase II: RSU initialization
Require: PKi = Qi, SKi = sQi, Sαi = αQi, and Sγi = γQi
1: for all RSUj in the domain of CAi do
2: select random numbers xj, aj ∈ Z∗q, and
a pseudo identity PIDj for RSUj
3: set SKji = xjSKi = xjsQi, . this is RSUj secret key
PKji = xjPKi = xjQi, . this is RSUj public key
Sγji = xjSγi = xjγQi, . this is the secret OBU-certificate-signing key
Uj = ajP , Tj = H2(PKji||PIDj||Uj||Qi) ∈ Z∗q,
Vj = Sαi + ajTjPµ, and
certRSUji = (PKji , Uj, Vj, P IDj, Qi) . this is RSUj certificate
4: Select minimum and maximum value for the validity period (vperiod) of any OBU
certificate
5: Upload certRSUji , Sγji , the minimum and maximum value of vperiod, P, P◦, Pα,
Pγ, Pµ, H1, and H2 in RSUj
6: end for
certificates for OBUs, the minimum and maximum value of the validity period of OBUs
certificates, and publicly known parameters (P, P◦, Pα, Pγ, Pµ, H1, and H2).
Remarks on Algorithm 2
• It should be noted that Uj and Vj are the signature of CAi on certRSUji .
• CAi stores RSUj real identity, PIDj, certRSUji , SKji, and Sγji, thus, CAi can track
the operations performed by RSUj, in case it is compromised, by associating PIDj
with its real identity.
• RSUj or any other entity can verify the certificate certRSUji by calculating Tj =
H2(PKji|| PIDj||Uj||Qi), and accepting if ê(P, Vj) = ê(Pα, Qi)ê(TjUj, Pµ). This
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verification follows since
ê(P, Vj) = ê(P, Sαi + ajTjPµ)
= ê(P, αQi + ajTjPµ)
= ê(P, αQi)ê(P, ajTjPµ)
= ê(αP,Qi)ê(TjajP, Pµ)
= ê(Pα, Qi)ê(TjUj, Pµ).
(3.1)
• The CA repeatedly runs Algorithm 2 to load each RSU with a set of certificates.
Each certificate is shared with a different group of RSUs to enforce the anonymous
group signature when generating OBUs certificates.
OBU initialization
Each CAi executes Algorithm 3, to upload each OBUm having identity IDOBUm in its
domain with a number (Ncert) of short lifetime certificates. The identity IDOBUm is a
unique identity loaded in OBUm during the manufacturing process.
Remarks on Algorithm 3
• In Algorithm 3, CAi selects an arbitrary RSUj in its service area as the certificate
issuer, and uses the security materials {certRSUji = (PKji , Uj, Vj, P IDj, Qi),
SKji = xjsQi, Sγji = xjγQi } of RSUj. Note that CAi is the entity which issued
these security materials for RSUj.
• CAi stores the real identity (IDOBUm) and {PIDm,r, certmji,r, SKmji,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}
of OBUm, thus, CAi can efficiently track OBUm, in case it is compromised, by
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Algorithm 3 Phase II: OBU initialization
Require: {certRSUji = (PKji , Uj, Vj, P IDj, Qi), SKji = xjsQi, and Sγji = xjγQi }
of RSUj and IDOBUm of OBUm
1: for all OBUm in the domain of CAi do
2: Check the validity of IDOBUm
3: if IDOBUm is invalid then
4: return ⊥
5: else
6: for r ← 1 to Ncert, CAi do
7: Select random numbers ym,r, bm,r ∈ Z∗q
8: Set ym,rSKji = ym,rxjsQi, and . partial secret key
ym,rPKji = ym,rxjQi . partial public key
9: end for
10: return {ym,rSKji , ym,rPKji |1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} to OBUm
11: for r ← 1 to Ncert, OBUm do
12: Select a random number zm,r ∈ Z∗q
13: Set SKmji,r = zm,rym,rSKji = zm,rym,rxjsQi, and . final secret key
PKmji,r = zm,rym,rPKji = zm,rym,rxjQi . final public key
14: end for
15: return {PKmji,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} to CAi
16: for r ← 1 to Ncert, CAi do
17: Select a validity period vperiodm,r, and a pseudo identity PIDm,r
18: Set U 8m,r = bm,rP ,
Lm,r = H2(PKmji,r||vperiodm,r||PIDm,r||U 8m,r) ∈ Z∗q,
V 8m,r = Sγji + bm,rLm,rPµ, and




m,r, vperiodm,r, P IDm,r, certRSUji)
19: end for
20: Upload {certOBUmji,r |1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {PKmji,r, U 8m,r, V 8m,r, vperiodm,r,
P IDm,r, certRSUji |1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}, P, P◦, Pα, Pγ, Pµ, H1, and H2 in OBUm
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associating PIDm to IDOBUm .
• It should be noted that throughout the rest of the Chapter whenever the subscript r
equals 1, it will be omitted for the ease of presentation.
• Any entity in the network can verify a single certificate certOBUmji by verifying
certRSUji , then, verifying certOBUmji . Alternatively, certRSUji and certOBUmji can
be aggregately verified as follows:
1. Check vperiod and proceed only if it is valid;
2. Calculate Tj = H2(PKji ||PIDj||Uj||Qi) and Lm = H2(PKmji||vperiod||PIDm||U 8m);
3. Accept if ê(P, Vj + V
8
m) = ê(Pα, Qi)ê(Pγ, PKji) ê(TjUj + LmU
8
m, Pµ). This veri-
fication follows since
ê(P, Vj + V
8
m) = ê(P, Sαi + ajTjPµ + Sγji + bmLmPµ)
= ê(P, αQi)ê(P, xjγQi)ê(P, ajTjPµ + bmLmPµ)
= ê(αP,Qi)ê(γP, xjQi)ê(ajTjP + LmbmP, Pµ)




• Including certRSUji in certOBUmji guarantees that certOBUmji is generated by a le-
gitimate RSUj with a valid public key PKji . This inclusion also gives the CA the
ability to revoke any operation performed by a compromised RSU during the period
from the RSU compromising until the detection of the compromised RSU. In other
words, consider an attacker compromises an RSUl having a certificate certRSUli , and
the attacker generates some OBUs’ certificates from the compromised RSUl. When
the CA detects that RSUl is compromised, it revokes certRSUli . The revocation of
certRSUli automatically revokes all the OBUs certificates generated by RSUj, as those
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certificates contain the revoked certRSUli .
3.4.2 OBUs Certificates Update
The DCS scheme enables an OBU to update its certificate from an RSU. Thus, the scala-
bility of the DCS scheme stems from the distributed certification service compared to the
centralized certification service in the classical PKI where an OBU has to contact a CA to
update its certificate. Since the DCS scheme depends on the RSUs to update the certifi-
cates of the OBUs, the density of RSUs is crucial to the operation of the DCS scheme. In
this section, we discuss the adaptability of the DCS scheme to different densities of RSUs,
and how an OBU can update its certificates dynamically even if it is roaming between
different domains. In the certificate update process, an RSU generates a number of short
lifetime anonymous certificates for an OBU sufficient to secure the communications of the
OBU until it meets another RSU. The number of generated certificates by an RSU depends
on the RSUs density.
Adapting DCS to Different RSUs Densities
In this section, we discuss how the DCS scheme can adapt to different densities of RSUs.
Let TRSU denote the duration an OBU spent between meeting two different RSUs on its
way. When the number of RSUs in a given area increases, it is intuitive that TRSU will
decrease and vice versa, i.e., TRSU is inversely proportional to the RSUs density. It should
be noted that an OBU has to periodically change its certificate during TRSU to avoid being
tracked. Since an OBU spends a time of vperiod, which is the validity period of the OBU
certificate, using the same certificate, the number of certificates Ncert required to protect
the privacy of that OBU in the duration it spent between meeting two different RSUs can
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An OBUn moving on the road can calculate its TRSU value based on its direction, speed,
and the coordinates of the RSUs initially loaded in its GPS receiver. When OBUn needs
to update its certificates, it sends a request to update its certificate and the value of its
TRSU to an RSUj. Then, using eq. (3.3) and the appropriate value for vperiod, RSUj
can calculate the required number of certificates (Ncert) that should be generated to the
requesting OBUn to protect its privacy until it meets the next RSU on its way. In this
way, the DCS scheme can adapt to different RSUs densities.
OBUs Dynamic Certificates Update
The DCS offers a full interoperability for any OBU to update its certificate in a com-
pletely transparent way, even when it roams into a domain different from its home domain.




n, vperiod, PIDn, certRSUlw)
generated by RSUl in the domain of CAw, enters the domain of CAi, and needs to update
its certificate from RSUj which has a certificate certRSUji = (PKji , Uj, Vj, P IDj, Qi), as
shown in Fig. 3.3 where OBUn is shown in green. The certificate update algorithm, shown
in Fig. 3.4, has two phases: phase I for mutual authentication and generating a shared
secret key in a non-interactive way, and phase II for issuing a bundle of Ncert short lifetime
anonymous certificates for OBUn. The OBU-Certificate-Update algorithm is as follows.
Phase I
1. When OBUn receives the periodically broadcast certificate certRSUji of RSUj, it
verifies certRSUji by calculating Tj = H2(PKji ||PIDj||Uj||Qi) and proceeds only if
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Phase I
Phase II
Broadcast certRSUjicertOBUnlwEncKnj ( TRSU)
Figure 3.4: OBU Certificate Update
ê(P, Vj) = ê(Pα, Qi)ê(TjUj, Pµ). If valid, OBUn calculates the shared secret key (knj)
using its secret key SKnlw and the public key PKji of RSUj included in certRSUji
as knj = ê(SKnlw , PKji) = ê(znynxlsQw, xjQi) = ê(Qw, Qi)
znynxlxjs = kjn. Then,
OBUn calculates TRSU based on its speed, destination, and the loaded coordinates
of the RSUs. After that, OBUn encrypts TRSU with knj, and sends its certificate
certOBUnlw along with the encrypted TRSU to RSUj;
2. RSUj verifies certOBUnlw by calculating Tl = H2(PKlw ||PIDl||Ul||Qw) and Ln =
H2(PKnlw ||vperiod||PIDn||U 8n), and proceeds only if ê(P, Vl + V 8n) = ê(Pα, Ql)
ê(Pγ, PKlw)ê(TlUl + LnU
8
n, Pµ). If valid, RSUj calculates the shared secret key as
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kjn = ê(PKnlw , SKji) = ê(znynxlQw, xjsQi) = ê(Qw, Qi)
znynxlxjs = knj in a non-
interactive key agreement way. Then, RSUj decrypts TRSU using knj, and calculates
Ncert using eq. (3.3) based on the bounds of the certificate validity period vperiod
settled by CAi.
Phase II
3. As shown in Fig. 3.4, RSUj selects Ncert random numbers {y8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} ∈
Z∗q, and calculates Ncert partial secret keys as {y8n,rxjsQi|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} and the
corresponding Ncert partial public keys {y8n,rxjQi|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}. Then, it securely
delivers the partial key pairs to OBUn by encrypting them with the shared secret
key knj established in Phase I ;
4. OBUn selects Ncert random numbers {z8n,r ∈ Z∗q|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}, and calculates its
final secret keys {SKnji,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {z8n,ry8n,rxjsQi|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} and its
final public key {PKnji,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {z8n,ry8n,rxjQi|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}. After that,
OBUn sends its final public keys {PKnji,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} to RSUj;
5. For each key in {PKnji,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}, RSUj chooses a validity period vperiodn,r
and a pseudo identity PIDn,r. After that, RSUj selects Ncert random numbers
{b8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} ∈ Z∗q, and calculates {U 8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {b8n,rP |1 ≤
r ≤ Ncert}, {L8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {H2(PKnji,r||vperiodn,r||PIDn,r|| U 8n,r)|1 ≤
r ≤ Ncert} ∈ Z∗q, and {V 8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {Sγji + b8n,rL8n,rPµ|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert}.
Finally, RSUj issues {certOBUnji,r |1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} = {(PKnji,r, U 8n,r, V 8n,r, vperiodn,r,
P IDn,r, certRSUji)|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} and delivers them to OBUn over a channel secured
by the key knj;
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6. OBUn verifies the received certificates {certOBUnji,r |1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} by calculating
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By the end of phase II, OBUn gets Ncert short lifetime anonymous certificates which
are sufficient to protect its privacy until it meets another RSU on its way.
Remarks
• The preceding algorithm enables an OBUn from one domain (CAw) to securely up-
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date its certificate in another domain (CAi). Especially, if i = w, OBUn updates its
certification in its local domain.
• By increasing the number of the short lifetime certificates an OBU can get from an
RSU, the distance an OBU can move without the need to contact another RSU to
update its certificates increases. In other words, by changing the number of certifi-
cates Ncert, the DCS scheme can adapt to different densities of RSUs. Consider a
constant vperiod = 1min [4] for all the certificates of an OBU, and the OBU average
speed in a domain is 60 Km/h. When an OBU updates its certificates from an RSU
for values of Ncert equal 5 and 10 certificates, these values are sufficient to protect
the privacy of that OBU over distances of 5 km and 10 km, respectively, without the
need to contact another RSU.
• When an RSUj uses one of its certificates (certRSUji) and signing keys (Sγji) to issue
a certificate for an OBU, this is corresponding to using anonymous group signature
since Sγji and certRSUji are shared among multiple RSUs. Also, the generated certifi-
cate for OBU contains a pseudo identity (PID) which cannot be related to the real
identity of the OBU. Since an observer can link an OBU certificate to neither the
real identity of the OBU nor the location of the RSU which issued that certificate,
the issued certificate certOBUnji is anonymous.
• The non-interactive key agreement in Phase I (Step 1 and Step 2) is very attractive
to vehicular networks, since it enables any entity A to establish a shared secret key
with another entity B by calculating the bilinear pairing of its secret key and the
public key of B. The non-interactive key agreement is of significant importance for
updating certificates and establishing secure channels in VANETs.
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3.4.3 Certificate Revocation
Revocation is required to prevent compromised entities from accessing the network. In
the DCS scheme, we adopt the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) method, which is the
revocation method employed in the WAVE standard [2]. A CRL is a list containing all
the identities and the validity periods of the revoked certificates. It should be noted that
the short lifetime certificates of OBUs will be self revoked after their lifetime expires.
The certificates of an entity (OBU or RSU) are added to a CRL only if the entity is
compromised. When an entity (OBU or RSU) is compromised in one domain, the CA
responsible for that domain adds all the certificates of the compromised entity to the current
CRL, and broadcasts the new CRL in its domain. Each entity continuously maintains the
recently received CRL by removing the certificates with expired validity periods.
According to the distribution of the CRLs in the DCS scheme, each CA distributes the
CRL to the RSUs in its domain through its local Ethernet. Then, the RSUs receiving the
new CRL broadcasts it to all the OBUs in that domain. Also, the CRL is delivered from
the border RSUs in one domain (i) to the border RSUs in the adjacent domain (w) to
enable the border RSUs in domain (w) to check the revocation status of the OBUs coming
from domain (i). However, the CRL corresponding to domain (i) will be kept in the border
RSUs in domain w, and it will not be further broadcast in domain w. For example, a CRL
is broadcast by CAi in its domain (see Fig. 3.3). This CRL is broadcast in domain i until
it reaches RSUj. Then, RSUj broadcasts this CRL in its coverage area, and it delivers
this CRL to RSUl in domain w. RSUl stores this CRL to check the revocation status of
the OBUs moving from domain i to domain w. In case RSUs do not completely cover the
domain of a CA, Laberteaux et al. [11] show that V2V communication can be used to
efficiently distribute a CRL to all the OBUs. More results about the efficiency of the CRL
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distribution using V2V communications can be found in [11].
3.5 Certificate-Based Message Signature and Verifi-
cation
To satisfy the data authentication and non-repudiation security requirements of VANETs,
each entity in the system should be capable of signing and verifying a given message
with the corresponding certificate. In this section, we present the basic message signature
and verification, followed by the proposed batch verification for message signature and
certificate.
3.5.1 OBU/RSU/CA Message Signature and Verification




m) for a given message M
as follows.
1. Select a random number cm ∈ Z∗q;




m = cmP , Rm = H2(M ||PKmji||U 88m||PIDm||tstamp) ∈
Z∗q, and V 88m = SKmji + cmRmPµ;
3. (U 88m, V
88
m) is a valid signature on M .
Any entity in the network can verify the signature (U 88m, V
88
m) on the message M as
follows.
1. Verify that the sender of the message is a valid user and check the time stamp tstamp;
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2. Calculate
Rm = H2(M ||PKmji ||U 88m||PIDm||tstamp); (3.6)
3. Accept if
ê(P, V 88m) = ê(P, SKmji + cmRmPµ)
= ê(P, SKmji)ê(P, cmRmPµ)
= ê(P, zmymxjsQi)ê(P, cmRmPµ)
= ê(sP, zmymxjQi)ê(RmcmP, Pµ)




Similarly, any CA or RSU can sign an arbitrary message using the aforementioned
procedures.
3.5.2 Batch Verification for Messages Signatures
Consider an OBU A receives (U 881 , V 881 ), (U 882 , V 882 ), · · · , (U 88K , V 88K), which are the signa-
tures on the messages M1, M2, · · · , MK , respectively. Then, those signatures can be
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where PKOBU,k is the public key in certificate k.
PROOF: Firstly, we consider an OBU A receives two messages from OBUm and OBUn,




m) on the message M1, where U
88
m = cmP and
V 88m = SKm + cmRmPµ = zmymxjsQi + cmRmPµ. In addition, OBUn generates a signature
(U 88n , V
88
n ) on the message M2, where U
88
n = cnP and V
88
n = SKm + cnRnPµ = znynxjsQi +
cnRnPµ. OBU A calculates V
88
= V 88m+ V
88
n = zmymxjsQi+cmRmPµ+znynxjsQi+cnRnPµ.




) = ê(P, zmymxjsQi + cmRmPµ + znynxjsQi + cnRnPµ)
= ê(P, zmymxjsQi + znynxjsQi)ê(P, cmRmPµ + cnRnPµ)
= ê(sP, zmymxjQi + znynxjQi)ê(Rmcm + PRncnP, Pµ)












As for the multiple-message, they can be verified in a similar way.
3.5.3 Batch Verification for Certificates




m, vperiodm, P IDm, certRSUji),




n, vperiodn, P IDn, certRSUlw), where
certRSUji = (PKji , Uj, Vj, P IDj, Qi) and certRSUlw = (PKlw , Ul, Vl, P IDl, Qw).
An independent third party can aggregately verify the OBUs certificates and the RSUs
certificates included in them as follows.
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1. Check vperiod of each certificate and proceed only if valid;
2. Calculate Tj = H2(PKji ||PIDj||Uj||Qi) and Tl = H2(PKli ||PIDl||Ul||Qi);
3. Calculate Lm = H2(PKmji||vperiodm||PIDm||U 8m) and Ln = H2(PKnlw ||vperiodn||PIDn
||U 8n);
4. Calculate V = Vj + Vl, V
8
= V 8m + V
8





5. Accept if ê(P, V + V
8
) = (Pα, Qi +Qw)ê(Pγ, PKji + PKlw)ê(U + U
8
, Pµ). This veri-
fication holds since
ê(P, V + V
8
) = ê(P, Sαi + ajTjPµ + Sαw + alTlPµ + Sγji + bmLmPµ + Sγlw + bnLnPµ)
= ê(P, αQi + ajTjPµ + αQw + alTlPµ + xjγQi + bmLmPµ + xlγQw + bnLnPµ)
= ê(P, αQi + αQw)(P, xjγQi + xlγQw)ê(P, ajTjPµ + alTlPµ + bmLmPµ + bnLnPµ)
= ê(αP,Qi +Qw)ê(γP, xjQi + xlQw)ê(TjUj + TlUl + LmU
8 + LnU
8, Pµ)




For K OBUs, their certificates can be aggregately verified as follows:






























3.5. CERTIFICATE-BASED MESSAGE SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION
3.5.4 Batch Verification for Messages Signatures and Certificates
Consider K OBUs with K certificates generating different K signatures on K different mes-
sages. An independent third party can aggregately verify the K signatures and certificates
by combining eq. (3.8) and eq. (3.11) as follows.



















The proof of eq. (3.12) follows directly from eq. (3.9) and eq. (3.10). Eq. (3.12) shows
that the DCS scheme overcomes the need to separately verify signatures and certificates
of the senders, which is common to most of the existing batch verification schemes. The
DCS scheme amplifies the capabilities of any entity in the network to simultaneously ver-
ify a relatively large number of signatures and certificates compared to the conventional
verification method which verifies signatures and certificates one by one, thus, decreasing
the verification overhead.
It should be noted that eq. (3.12) can be used by any OBU or RSU to verify the
signatures and the certificates included in the K different messages sent by K OBUs.
Consequently, eq. (3.12) represents how authentication can be achieved in V2V and V2I
communications.
When there are invalid signatures in the received messages, the data cross checking
technique employed in the WAVE standard can alleviate the effect of the invalid signatures.
In specific, each OBUn compares the data included in the received message from an OBUm
with those received from other OBUs. If there is a mismatch, OBUn rejects the message.
It should be noted that the data cross checking technique is useful only when the data
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contents of the message are malicious. However, if either the data contents of the message
are correct and the signature is invalid or the message and signature are correct and the
certificate is invalid, this technique is not useful. In such case, a search approach based on
the binary authentication tree [44] can be employed to avoid individually verifying every
signature.
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the proposed DCS scheme according to the security objectives
presented in section 3.3.1.
1. Authentication: It can be seen that finding the secret keys s, α, γ, µ from the
corresponding public keys P◦, Pα, Pγ, Pµ are instances of the ECDLP problem. For
example, to find s, we have the following ECDLP problem: given P and P◦ = sP , find
s. In DCS, the authentication of RSUs and OBUs is achieved using digital certificates.
For example, the signature of any CAi on the certificate of any RSUj is (Uj, Vj),
where Uj = ajP , Tj = H2(PKji||PIDj||Uj||Qi) ∈ Z∗q, and Vj = Sαi + ajTjPµ. It
can be seen that to forge the certificate of any RSUj, an attacker should know either
Sαi = αQi or ajTjPµ. Since Qi is publicly known, finding Sαi reduces to finding α
which is ECDLP problem as indicated above. Also, since Tj can be easily obtained
from the certificate of RSUj, finding ajTjPµ reduces to finding ajPµ, which can be
formulated as a CDH problem, i.e., given Uj = ajP and Pµ = µP , find ajPµ =
ajµP . The hardness of the CDH problem is closely related to solving the Discrete
Logarithm (DL) problem [41]. Similar analogy applies to the OBUs certificates. Since
ECDLP and CDH are hard computational problems [40][41], i.e., they cannot be
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solved in a sub-exponential time, the certificates of RSUs and OBUs are unforgeable.
Since in each communication, an authentication of the sender is performed first,
an illegitimate entity cannot communicate with the authentic network users. Also,
data authentication is achieved by employing digital signatures, where any message
transmitted by any CA, RSU, or OBU has to be signed first. Consequently, any
message alteration during the transmission will be detected by the recipient. In
clogging attacks, an attacker tries to impersonate a legitimate user, and overwhelms
legitimate entities in the network by involving them in a large volume of key exchange
or by sending bogus messages [45]. In the DCS scheme, each OBU/RSU authenticates
the received messages before being involved in any key exchange or responding to the
received message. According to [45], since authentication is done first before taking
any action, the clogging attacks is hard to launch in the proposed DCS scheme.
2. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is achieved by requiring all the messages ex-
changed in the network to be digitally signed by its issuer. For example, the sig-
nature of any OBUm on an arbitrary message M is (U
88, V 88), where U 88 = cP , and
V 88 = SKmji + cRPµ. Similar to the above discussion of the security of RSUs certifi-
cates, to forge the signature of OBUm on M , the attacker has to find either SKmji ,
which is ECDLP problem, or cRPµ, which is CDH problem. Consequently, the signa-
ture of any entity cannot be forged. In addition, since non-repudiation is guaranteed,
the liability requirement is also achieved since users cannot deny the transmission or
the content of their messages.
3. Privacy: In DCS, privacy is preserved by the following techniques:
• Anonymous authentication: Anonymous authentication is employed in DCS in
the sense that each OBU has a certificate containing only a pseudo identity,
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which cannot lead in any way to the real identity of the OBU. Furthermore, by
deploying anonymous authentication, the DCS scheme can efficiently prevent
an adversary from tracking the real identity of the users.
• Frequent certificate update: OBUs certificates have a short-lifetime. As a re-
sult, each OBU has to periodically change its certificate, which decreases the
probability of being tracked by an external observer.
• Anonymous certificate issuer: Since each RSU certificate is shared among mul-
tiple RSUs, the RSU certificate included in each OBU certificate cannot lead to
the location where the OBU issued its certificate.
• Avoiding key escrow: When an OBUm updates its certificate from an RSUj,
RSUj sends a partial secret key ymxjsQi toOBUm. After that, OBUm calculates
its final secret key as SKmji = zmymxjsQi. It can be seen that finding SKmji
from the partial secret key is ECDLP problem. Since the secret key of any OBU
cannot be forged, the DCS is free from the key screw which is common to any
PKI. As a result, the messages signed by the secret key of any OBU can only be
verified by the public key of that OBU, and this signature cannot be generated
by any other entity in the network, hence, achieving high privacy level.
Although the DCS offers a collation of privacy preserving mechanisms, an observer
can still launch a tracking attack on an OBU. However, this tracking attack requires
an observer to launch a large number of receivers along the path of the targeted
OBU, and the targeted OBU has to move with the same velocity and in the same
lane between any pair of adjacent receivers launched by the observer [4]. To pro-
tect the OBUs against this tracking of attack, the DCS can be efficiently integrated
with Random Encryption Periods (REPs) proposed in [46]. In REPs, using group
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communications, an OBU surrounds itself with an encrypted communication zone to
violate the conditions of being tracked by an observer.
4. Transparent roaming: Since any OBU can update its certificate from any RSU in the
network, the DCS scheme overcomes the need to re-register the OBU entering a new
domain with the new CA. Consequently, the transparent roaming is guaranteed in
the DCS scheme.
5. Access control: Any illegal network access by a compromised RSU can be efficiently
thwarted, since a CA can broadcast a revocation message including the certificates
of that RSU. Once receiving that revocation message, all the OBUs can de-associate
with that compromised RSU. Also, all the OBUs certificates issued by that RSU
are revoked, as the revoked RSU certificates are contained in those certificates. In
addition, a CA can revoke any misbehaving OBU by broadcasting a CRL containing
the certificate of the misbehaving OBU. Consequently, all the network RSUs and
OBUs terminate the communications with that OBU.
3.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the DCS scheme from different aspects.
3.7.1 OBU Certificate Update Delay
In this subsection, we compare between the OBU certificate update delay in the DCS
scheme, the ECPP protocol, and the classical PKI where an OBU has to contact a CA to
update its certificates.
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OBUn certificate verification RSUj 4Tpair + 2Tmul
calculation of the shared key kjn RSUj Tpair
step(3)
calculation of Ncert partial public keys RSUj NcertTmul
calculation of Ncert partial secret keys RSUj NcertTmul
step(4) generation of Ncert final public keys OBUn NcertTmul
step(5)
calculation of {U 8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} RSUj NcertTmul
calculation of {L8n,r|1 ≤ r ≤ Ncert} RSUj NcertTmul
Let Tcert−DCS, Tcert−ECPP , and Tcert−CA denote the time from the moment an OBU
requests Ncert new certificates from an RSU to the moment it receives the required certifi-
cates in the DCS scheme, ECPP protocol, and the classical PKI, respectively. We consider
the cryptography delay only due to the pairing and point multiplication operations on an
elliptic curve as they are the most time consuming operations in the schemes under con-
sideration. Let Tpair and Tmul denote the time required to perform a pairing operation and
a point multiplication, respectively. In [26], Tpair and Tmul are found for an MNT curve
with embedding degree k = 6 to be equal to 4.5 msec, and 0.6 msec, respectively. Let
Tcrypt−DCS and Tcrypt−ECPP denote the total incurred cryptography delay from the moment
an OBU requests Ncert new certificates from an RSU to the moment it receives the required
certificates in the DCS scheme, and ECPP protocol, respectively. It should be noted that
the cryptography delay (Tcrypt) is part of the certificate update delay (Tcert) in any of the
schemes under consideration. Table 3.2 gives the cryptography delay incurred in each step
of the DCS certificate update algorithm, shown in Fig. 3.4, from the moment an OBU
requests Ncert new certificates from an RSU, i.e., step (2), until it receives the required
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(a) City street map (b) RSUs connection pattern
Figure 3.5: Simulation scenario
certificates, i.e., by the end of step (5). According to Table 3.2, we have
Tcrypt−DCS = 5Tpair + (2 + 5Ncert)Tmul (3.13)
In the ECPP protocol [24], an RSU generates only one certificate for an OBU requesting
certificate update. However, the ECPP protocol can be easily extended to enable an RSU
to generate a bundle of Ncert certificates for the requesting OBU similar to the DCS scheme.
In the case where ECPP protocol generates Ncert for the requesting protocol, we have
Tcrypt−ECPP = (3 + 5Ncert)Tpair + (4 + 9Ncert)Tmul (3.14)
We have conducted two ns-2 [47] simulations to respectively compare certificate update
delay of the DCS scheme with that of the ECPP protocol and the classical PKI for the
city street scenario shown in Fig. 3.5(a). The adopted simulation parameters are given in
Table 3.3. The mobility traces adopted in this simulation are generated using TraNS [48].
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Table 3.3: NS-2 simulation parameters for DCS
simulation area 13.4 Km× 12.3 Km
simulation time 100 sec
max. vehicle speed 60 Km/h
OBU transmission range 300 m
MAC protocol 802.11a
OBU information dissemination interval 300 msec
wired channel capacity 100 Mbps
wireless channel capacity 6 Mbps
number of RSUs 576
distribution of RSUs uniform
We use the IEEE 802.11a standard, which is the basis of DSRC, to simulate the Medium
Access Control (MAC) protocol for VANETs [48][49]. VANETs have two types of links:
wireless links connecting OBUs to each other and to the RSUs and wired links connecting
the RSUs in one domain and the CA responsible for that domain as shown in Fig. 3.3 (we
consider only the domain of CAi in Fig. 3.3). According to the DSRC specifications, each
wireless data channel in VANET has a bandwidth of 10 MHz corresponding to channel
data rate in the range of 3 Mbps− 27 Mbps [50]. We select a data rate of 6 Mbps for the
wireless channels in VANET. We consider the links of the Ethernet connecting the RSUs
and CAi to have data rate of 100 Mbps. The RSUs connection pattern employed in our
simulation is shown in Fig. 3.5(b). The adopted RSU connection considers a well deployed
VANET, where the RSUs are uniformly distributed with the distance between any pair
of adjacent RSUs is 500 m. CAi is located at the top left corner of the city scenario
shown in Fig. 3.5(a). To simulate real-life VANET scenarios, we conduct the certificate
update scenarios imposed on VANET safety-related applications, where each OBU has to
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Figure 3.6: Certificate update delay for DCS and ECPP
disseminate information about the road condition every 300 msec according to DSRC.
The first simulation is conducted to compare the certificate update delay in the DCS
scheme with that in the ECPP protocol. Fig. 3.6 shows the certificate update delay in
msec for the DCS scheme and the ECPP protocol vs. the simulation time in sec. In the
conducted simulation, we consider Ncert to be constant for all the OBUs, where we consider
values of Ncert equal 1, 5, and 10 certificates. In addition, an OBU sends a certificate update
request every 10 sec during the simulation, and the corresponding certificate update delay
is measured. The variations in Tcert−DCS and Tcert−ECPP are due to the variations of the
distance separating the OBU requesting the certificate update and the RSU issuing the
certificate. Table 3.4 shows the average values of the certificate update delay shown in Fig.
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Figure 3.7: Certificate update delay for DCS and classical PKI
3.6. It can be seen from Table 3.4 that the DCS scheme outperforms the ECPP protocol
and the percentage of the delay-saving obtained by DCS compared to ECPP increases with
Ncert. It should be noted that the average values for Tcert−DCS and Tcert−ECPP in Table 3.4
are independent on the density of the RSUs as only one RSU is involved in each certificate
update process. Therefore, the RSUs density has no effect on the certificate update delay.
The second simulation is conducted to compare the certificate update delay of the DCS
scheme with that of the classical PKI [2] under a well-deployed VANET. The classical
PKI certificate update requires each OBU requesting certificate update to contact the CA
through the RSUs as the CA is the only entity responsible for generating the certificates.
ECDSA [51] is the classical PKI digital signature method chosen by the WAVE standard,
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Table 3.4: Average certificate update delay
Ncert avg. Tcert−DCS (msec) avg. Tcert−ECPP (msec) delay-saving
1 36.2 44.4 18.5%
5 48.8 98 50.2%
10 63.3 170.5 62.9%
where a certificate and signature verification takes 4Tmul, and a signature generation takes
Tmul.
We consider two certificate update scenarios shown in Fig. 3.3 as follows. The first
scenario is the classical PKI certificate update, where OBUm (shown in red) needs to
update its certificates. Hence, it should send a certificate update request to CAi via the
nearest RSU, which in this case is RSU1. After the request reaches RSU1, it will be
forwarded through the RSUs’ Ethernet to CAi, where the request message experiences a
delay of 4Tmul at each intermediate RSU, as each RSU has to verify the certificate and the
signature of the sender before forwarding the request, otherwise, a denial of service attack
can be easily launched by sending faked requests, which can overwhelm CAi. When the
certificate update request reaches CAi, it has to verify the request which takes 4Tmul, and
generate new Ncert certificates for OBUm which takes NcertTmul. Then, CAi forwards the
new certificates to RSUl which in turn forwards them to OBUm. In the second scenario,
OBUm updates its certificates directly from RSU1 as proposed by the DCS scheme.
Fig. 3.7 shows the classical PKI certificate update delay Tcert−CA and the DCS certifi-
cate update delay Tcert−DCS in msec vs. the simulation time. We conducted simulation
for the two certificate update scenarios triggered by OBUm for Ncert equal 1 at three dif-
ferent locations: location1, location2, and location3 corresponding to initial distances of
2.7Km, 4.7Km, and 10.3Km, respectively, from CAi at the beginning of the simulation.
The certificate update process is triggered every 10 sec during the simulation and the
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corresponding certificate update delay is measured. The variations in Tcert−CA are due to
the number of the intermediate RSUs existing in the connection between CAi and OBUm.
It can be seen that Tcert−DCS is almost the same for the three locations, and is confined
within the range 31msec − 43msec. This is due to the fact that the DCS scheme is in-
dependent on CAi. On the other hand, it can be seen that Tcert−CA increases with the
distance from CAi. Consequently, the delay-saving of the proposed DCS scheme compared
to the classical PKI certificate update increases with distance from the CA. For example,
the average certificate update delay is 59.87 msec for location2, while that for the DCS
scheme is 36.2 msec. Consequently, the DCS scheme decreases the certificate update delay
by 39.54% compared to the classical PKI in that case. From the aforesaid discussion, it
can be seen that even under a well-deployed VANET the DCS scheme outperforms the
classical PKI in terms of certificate update delay, which directly translates into a better
certification service. In addition, since in the classical PKI, all certificates updates are
handled by the CA, it is expected that the certificate update delay from the CA increases
in real-life large scale VANETs.
3.7.2 Successful Certification Ratio
When an OBUm requests Ncert certificates from an RSUl, RSUl should process the re-
quest, generate the required certificates, and deliver them to OBUm before OBUm moves
out of the communication range of RSUl, otherwise, the certificate update process fails.
Therefore, if the number of certificate update requests is large, the RSU will not be able
to process all the requests and some requests may be dropped. To calculate the maximum








where NCmax is the maximum number of certificates an RSU can generate within its
coverage range R, S is the average speed of the OBUs within R, and Tcert is the average
certificate update delay of the scheme under consideration.
Successful Certification Ratio (SCR) is the metric usually used to evaluate the efficiency
of authentication algorithms [52]. SCR is defined as the ratio of the number of successful
certificate generations (NCs) to the number of total certificate requests (NCt). Hence, we
have
SCR =
 1 if NCt ≤ NCmaxNCs
NCt
if NCt > NCmax
(3.16)
We consider an RSU with R = 600m (corresponding to omnidirectional communication
range with radius 300 m according to DSRC), and the average speed of OBUs is S =
60 Km/h. Fig. 3.8 shows the successful certification ratio for the DCS scheme and the
ECPP protocol [24] for values of Ncert equal 1, 5, and 10 certificates vs. the total number of
certificate requests, where we used the values of Tcert in Table 3.4. It should be noted that
in the cases where Ncert > 1, each request in Fig. 3.8 is corresponding to generating Ncert
certificates. It can be seen that DCS gives a higher SCR than the ECPP protocol. Also,
the SCR for DCS with Ncert = 10 is even higher than that of the ECPP with Ncert = 5.
Since DCS can handle a larger number of certificates requests than ECPP for the same
duration, the DCS is more suitable for the requirement of vehicular networks.
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Figure 3.8: Successful certification ratio
Table 3.5: Example of the required densityRSU in DCS for vperiod = 1min and S =
60Km/h
state New York Hawaii
rural roads length (km) 106014 3285
urban roads length (km) 77033 3701
N cert (rural) 20 20
N cert (urban) 10 10
densityRSU (rural) 0.05 0.05
densityRSU (urban) 0.1 0.1
number of required RSUs (rural) 5301 165
number of required RSUs (urban) 7074 371
total number of RSUs 13005 536
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3.7.3 The Required RSUs Density in DCS
In this section, we give a rough estimate of the required RSUs density in the DCS scheme.
It is more meaningful to express the RSUs density (densityRSU) as the number of RSUs
per road unit length (Km) instead of per unit area (Km2) as RSUs are implemented only
on the roads, and a road width is generally much smaller than its length. The average




N cert vperiod S (Km), (3.17)
where N cert is the average number of the generated certificates per OBU from the RSUs,
vperiod is the average validity period of the OBUs certificates in min, and S is the average
speed of the OBUs in Km/h. It should be noted that the parameters in eq. (3.17) are
corresponding to only one domain. Since DRSU can be interpreted as the road distance
between two adjacent RSUs. Consequently, the required RSU density (densityRSU) for the






N cert vperiod S
(/Km) (3.18)
Eq. (3.18) can be used in the design phase of the DCS scheme to calculate the number of
RSUs needed for the operation of the DCS scheme.
Table 3.5 gives an example of the required densities and numbers of RSUs for New
York and Hawaii states for vperiod = 1min and S = 60Km/h. New York has an area
of 141299Km2 while that for Hawaii is 28311Km2 [53]. The total length of the urban
and rural roads is obtained from [54]. Since the density of the OBUs in an urban road is
higher than that in a rural road, it will not be cost-effective to implement RSUs in rural
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Table 3.6: RSUj certificate size in DCS
parameter PKji Uj Vj PIDj Qi certRSUji
size in bytes 21 21 21 8 21 92





m vperiod PIDm certRSUji certOBUmji
size in bytes 21 21 21 4 8 92 167
roads with a density equal to that in urban roads. Therefore, we select N cert for rural and
urban roads to be 20 and 10, respectively. The total number of the required RSUs can
be decreased by increasing the validity period (vperiod) of the certificates of the OBUs or
increasing Ncert. However, increasing vperiod increases the probability of being tracked,
i.e., lowering the privacy protection level. Also, increasing the number of certificates (Ncert)
generated from RSUs decreases the SCR as shown in Fig. 3.8. A compromise between the
privacy protection level and the SCR of RSUs should be made according to the required
RSUs density. It should be noted that each CA can change the minimum and maximum
bound to the value of the certificate validity period according to the required level of
privacy protection, and broadcast these bounds to the RSUs in its domain through its
local Ethernet.
3.7.4 Communication Overhead
We consider the Tate pairing implementation on an MNT curve with embedding degree
6, where G1 is represented by 161 bits. Accordingly, each point on this MNT curve is
represented by 21 bytes. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 give each parameter and the corresponding
size in bytes for an RSU and OBU certificate, respectively. The last column in each table
gives the total size of the certificate under consideration. It can be seen that an RSU has
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a certificate size of 92 bytes, while that for an OBU is 167 bytes.
It is indicated in section 3.5.1 that an OBUm with certOBUmji can generate a valid
signature (U 88, V 88) for an arbitrary message M . Since U 88 and V 88 are points on the elliptic
curve, the signature size in DCS is 42 bytes. Consequently, the communication overhead
incurred in a signed message transmitted by an OBU is 209 bytes, which is the certificate
size plus the signature size, compared to an overhead of 189 bytes in the ECPP protocol.
According to WAVE [2], the maximum payload data size in a signed message is 65.6 Kbytes.
Consequently, the ratio of the communication overhead incurred by the DCS scheme to
the payload data size is 0.3%, which means that the DCS scheme is feasible with respect
to the incurred communication overhead.
3.7.5 OBU Message Signing Delay
In DCS, the signature of an OBUm with certOBUmji on an arbitrary message M is (U
88, V 88).
The cryptography operation involved in calculating either U 88 or V 88 is point multiplication.
Therefore, the total delay for signing a message in DCS is 2Tmul. The second column in
Table 3.8 gives the message signing delay for ECDSA, BLS, CAS, ECPP, and DCS. BLS
is a pairing-based aggregate signature [55]. CAS is a certificateless aggregate signature
scheme [56], which is the basis of the DCS batch verification scheme.
It can be seen that ECDSA and ECPP give the lowest message signing delay, and DCS
gives the second lowest delay. The effect of the message signing delay is alleviated by the
fact that an OBU has to disseminate only one signed message every 300 msec, which means
that an OBU has a time window of 300 msec to prepare a signature on a message. The
DCS scheme has a message signing delay of 1.2 msec, which can be neglected compared
to the time window an OBU has to sign a message.
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Table 3.8: Signing and verification delay
Method message signing
one signature and K signatures and
certificate verification certificates verifications
ECDSA Tmul 4Tmul 4KTmul
BLS Tmul + Tmtp 4Tpair + 2Tmtp (2K + 2)Tpair + 2KTmtp
CAS 2Tmul + Tmtp 5Tpair + 2Tmtp (4K + 1)Tpair + 2KTmtp
ECPP Tmul 3Tpair + 11Tmul 3KTpair + 11KTmul
DCS 2Tmul 5Tpair + 3Tmul 5Tpair + 3KTmul
3.7.6 Batch Verification Delay
We compare the verification delay of the DCS batch signature and certificate verification
scheme with ECDSA, BLS, CAS, and ECPP.
The time needed to verify one ECDSA signature is 2Tmul, and that for BLS is 2Tpair +
Tmtp, where Tmtp is a map to point hash function. Tmtp is found for an MNT curve to
be 3.9 msec [57]. We consider the verification delay for a certificate sent with a message
signature for ECDSA and BLS to be equal to that of a signature verification. The time
needed to verify one CAS signature is 3Tpair + 2Tmtp. For CAS, there is no certificate;
however, to verify the sender, a check process must be performed which takes 2Tpair. For
ECPP, the total verification delay of a certificate and signature is 3Tpair + 11Tmul. For
the DCS scheme, the verification delay of a certificate and message signature requires
5Tpair + 3Tmul, where 5Tpair corresponds to the pairing operations in the left and right





. Table 3.8 shows a summary of the verification delays for ECDSA, BLS,
CAS, ECPP, and the DCS schemes.
Fig. 3.9 shows the verification delay in msec vs. the number of the received messages.
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Figure 3.9: Verification delay comparison between different schemes
It can be seen that the DCS scheme has the lowest verification delay. Also, from Table 3.8
and the values of Tpair, Tmtp, and Tmul, the most time-consuming operation in the signature
verification process of the schemes under consideration is the pairing operation. Hence, the
reason for the superiority of the DCS is that the number of the pairing operations required
for signatures verification is independent on the number of the signatures to be verified.
The maximum number of signatures and certificates that can be verified simultaneously
in 300 msec is 11, 14, 17, 124, and 154 messages for CAS, ECPP, BLS, ECDSA, and the
DCS schemes, respectively. The number of signatures and certificates that the DCS scheme
can verify is greater than that of the ECDSA by 24.2%. Fig. 3.10 shows the delay for
batch signature verification, batch certificate verification, and simultaneous batch signature
and certificate verification. The maximum number of certificates that can be verified
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Figure 3.10: Verification delay of the different batch schemes of DCS
aggregately within 300 ms is 234 certificates, while that for signatures is 477 signatures.
To further evaluate the DCS batch verification scheme, we conduct ns-2 [47] simulation
using the same parameters in Table 3.3 except for simulation area and time, which become
7.4 Km × 7.4 Km and 30 sec, respectively. In this simulation, we are interested in the
message loss incurred by OBUs due to V2V communications only, i.e., we do not consider
the implementation of RSUs. The average message loss ratio is defined as the average ratio
between the number of messages dropped every 300 msec, due to signatures and certificates
verification delay, and the total number of messages received every 300 msec. According to
DSRC, each OBU has to disseminate information about the road condition every 300 msec.
In order to react properly and instantly to the varying road conditions, each OBU should
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verify the messages received during the last 300 msec before disseminating a new message
about the road condition. Therefore, we chose to measure the message loss ratio every
300 msec. Fig. 3.11 shows the analytical and simulated average message loss ratio vs. the
average number of OBUs within the communication range of each OBU for DCS, ECPP,
ECDSA, BLS, and CAS, respectively. It can be seen that the simulated average message
loss ratio closely follows the analytical message loss ratio which is calculated based on the
maximum number of messages that can be verified within 300 msec in the schemes under
consideration. The difference between the analytical and simulations results stems from
observing that some zones in the simulated area become more congested than other zones,
thus, some OBUs experience higher message loss than other OBUs, which on the average
leads to that difference between the analytical and simulation results. Also, the proposed
DCS batch verification provides the lowest message loss ratio, and the message loss ratio
increases as the number of OBUs within communication range increases. The reason of
the superiority of the DCS scheme is that it can aggregately verify a number of signatures
higher than that of ECPP, ECDSA, BLS, or CAS.
3.7.7 Additional GPS Memory Requirements
In the DCS scheme, the GPS receiver in each OBU is required to be loaded with the
geographic coordinates of the RSUs, which incurs additional memory requirements. Ac-
cording to [2], each latitude or longitude coordinate of the geographic location of an RSU
is represented by 4 bytes. With the results obtained in section 3.7.3, the number of RSUs
in a CA domain is in the order of 104. Consequently, the memory size required to save the
coordinates of the RSUs in a domain requires 0.08 Mbytes. Most of the currently available
GPS receivers have sufficient memory storage to meet this requirement.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison between message loss ratio for different schemes
3.8 Summary
In this Chapter, we have proposed an efficient distributed certificate service (DCS) scheme
for vehicular communications, which offers a flexible interoperability to avoid the key escrow
issue in different administrative authorities and an efficient distributed algorithm for any
OBUs to update or revoke its certificate from the available RSUs in a timely manner. In
addition, with the batch verification, the entities in the DCS scheme can rapidly verify a
mass of message signatures and certificates simultaneously. Therefore, the proposed DCS
scheme can significantly reduce the complexity of certificate management, and achieve





Revocation Protocol for Vehicular
Ad Hoc Networks
In this Chapter, we propose an Efficient Decentralized Revocation (EDR) protocol based
on a novel pairing-based threshold scheme and a probabilistic key distribution technique.
Because of the decentralized nature of the EDR protocol, it enables a group of legitimate
vehicles to perform fast revocation of a nearby misbehaving vehicle. Consequently, the EDR
protocol improves the safety levels in VANETs as it diminishes the revocation vulnerability
window existing in the conventional Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). By conducting
detailed performance evaluation, the EDR protocol is demonstrated to be reliable, efficient,
and scalable.
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4.1 Introduction
According to [2], VANET will rely on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as a compre-
hensive method to secure its operation. In PKI, a central Certification Authority (CA)
issues an authentic digital certificate for each node in the network. Efficient certificate
management is essential for reliable and robust operation of any PKI. A critical part of
any certificate management scheme is the revocation of misbehaving nodes. Certificate
revocation can be centralized or decentralized. For centralized revocation, a central entity,
such as the CA, is the only entity in the network that can take the revocation decision for a
certain node. For decentralized revocation, the node revocation is done by the neighboring
nodes of the misbehaving node.
According to the IEEE 1609.2 standard [2], vehicular networks depend on Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) and short-lifetime certificates to achieve revocation. In such case,
to revoke a vehicle, a CRL has to be issued by the CA and broadcast by the infrastructure
RSUs. The network scale of VANETs is expected to be very large. Hence, the distribution
of CRLs is prone to long delays [11] [12]. Moreover, centralizing the revocation decision to
the CA renders the CA a bottleneck and a single point of failure. In addition, during the
early deployment of VANETs, it is expected that RSUs will not be uniformly distributed
in the network. Hence, CRL is not proper for applications requiring fast revocation of
misbehaving vehicles. Revocation can also be achieved by relying on certificates with short-
lifetimes, where a certificate is automatically revoked after its lifetime expires. In VANETs,
each vehicle takes life-critical actions based on the received messages from its neighboring
vehicles. Hence, VANETs cannot depend solely on the short-lifetime certificates, as a
misbehaving vehicle can harm other vehicles until its certificate lifetime expires.
For a practical revocation method, it is required that revocation of misbehaving vehicles
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should take place as fast as possible to prevent these vehicles from jeopardizing the safety
of other vehicles. Also, the revocation should be done in a decentralized way to alleviate
the load on the CA. In addition, the revocation method should be independent of RSUs,
which may not be uniformly distributed in the network. Finally, the revocation method
should not contradict with other security requirements so that it can be efficiently inte-
grated with other security mechanisms. To address the aforesaid challenges, we propose
an efficient decentralized revocation (EDR) protocol for VANETs, which enables a group
of neighboring vehicles to revoke a nearby misbehaving vehicle. The EDR protocol is inde-
pendent of the RSUs and the CA, which makes it suitable for the early deployment phase
of VANETs, where a nonuniform RSUs distribution is expected. Also, EDR distributes
the revocation load to all the vehicles, thus, avoiding overwhelming the CA. Moreover, it
achieves fast revocation of misbehaving vehicles, thus, decreasing the time window during
which a misbehaving vehicle can broadcast malicious messages. Consequently, the EDR
protocol increases the security level provided by VANETs. In addition, the revocation
messages, broadcast by the vehicles, have a security strength equivalent to that of the
revocation messages issued by the CA. The EDR protocol has a modular nature which
makes it integrable with any PKI system. It can also be used as a stand alone revocation
protocol or integrated with the CRL technique to compensate the absence of the RSUs in
some areas.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, preliminaries
are presented. The proposed EDR protocol is presented in section 4.3. The performance
analysis of the EDR protocol is discussed in section 4.4. Section 4.5 evaluates the EDR
protocol from the security point of view. Section 4.6 outlines how DCS and EDR can be
integrated followed by the summary in section 4.7.
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4.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the system model and security model adopted by the EDR
protocol.
4.2.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the system model under consideration consists of the followings.
• A Certification Authority (CA), which is responsible for generating initial certificates
for all the vehicles in the network, and it also acts as a Key Distribution Center
(KDC). Therefore, the CA is also responsible for distributing keys to all the vehicles
in the network;
• Road-Side Units (RSUs), which are fixed units distributed in the network. RSUs can
communicate securely with the CA;
• Vehicles, which can communicate either with other vehicles through Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) communications or with the infrastructure RSUs through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
(V2I) communications.
It should be noted that the system model under consideration is mainly a PKI system,
where each vehicle has a short-lifetime certificate used to secure its communication with
other entities in the network.
4.2.2 Security Model
In this section, we outline the security model adopted by the EDR protocol as follows.
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Figure 4.1: The system model.
• The CA is fully trusted by all the network entities. In addition, it has sufficient
physical securing mechanisms such that it cannot be compromised by any attacker
regardless of his capabilities;
• The RSUs are fixed in place, and they are fully controlled by the CA. Moreover, the
CA can instantly quarantine any compromised RSU;
• Vehicles have abundant resources in computation and storage. In addition, vehicles
can move freely in the network, and they can be easily compromised by an attacker;
• Revoked vehicles can collude together trying to revoke a legitimate innocent vehicle;
• Legitimate vehicles do not have sufficient incentives to disclose security materials
to the revoked vehicles, i.e., legitimate vehicles cannot collaborate with the revoked
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vehicles.
4.2.3 Security Objectives
On the design of the EDR protocol, we aim at achieving the following security objectives.
• Resistance to forging attacks : The generated revocation messages in the EDR pro-
tocol should be unforgeable such that any entity in the network must not be able
to generate a fake revocation message even if it has previously generated revocation
messages.
• Resistance to collusion attacks : The revoked vehicles must not be able to collude
together to revoke an innocent vehicle.
• Resistance to internal revocation-denial attacks : A legitimate vehicle should not be
able to deliberately fail the revocation process of a misbehaving vehicle.
• Resistance to external revocation-denial attacks : An external attacker is defined as
the attacker who has neither a valid certificate nor valid keys. An external attacker
must be able to neither share illegitimately in any revocation process nor fail the
revocation process of a misbehaving vehicle.
4.3 The EDR Protocol
The revocation process of any misbehaving vehicle consists of two phases as follows. The
first phase is the detection of the misbehaving vehicle, which can be performed by any group
vehicles by voting [35] on the misbehavior of a nearby vehicle or by any intrusion detection
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system. The second phase is the actual revoking of the misbehaving vehicle whether this
is done done using centralized mechanism via the CA or decentralized method via a group
of vehicles. In this phase, a revocation message is generated including the certificate of the
misbehaving vehicle.
In this Chapter, we present the EDR protocol which is mainly focusing on the second
phase of the revocation process, i.e., the actual revoking of misbehaving vehicles. The
proposed EDR protocol is based on probabilistic random key distribution technique and a
novel pairing-based threshold scheme.
4.3.1 System Initialization
The system is initialized as follows.
1. The CA issues a short-lifetime certificate for each vehicle in the network. Each vehicle
can update its certificate from either the RSUs or the CA;
2. Initially, the CA selects a generator P ∈ G1 of order q, and key pool consisting of l
keys, where each key kj ∈ Zq has a fixed identity j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l}. Each vehicle in
the network randomly picks from the key pool a key set (R) consisting of m distinct
keys;
3. The CA selects x random revocation secret keys SKSHARE = {s1, s2, s3, · · · , sx} =
{si|1 ≤ i ≤ x} from the key pool such that
∑x
i=1 si mod q = S, where S is
the secret key of the CA to sign a message, and for all i ∈ [1, x] ∃ j ∈ [1, l],
such that si = kj. It should be noted that S and the revocation secret keys
are equivalent to a threshold scheme [58], where the key S is equivalent to the
secret to be shared between multiple entities, and the revocation secret keys are
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equivalent to the shadows. Also, the CA calculates the revocation public keys





P, · · · , 1
sx
P} = { 1
si
P |1 ≤ i ≤ x} corresponding to the revocation secret keys
SKSHARE = {si|1 ≤ i ≤ x}. In addition, the CA calculates its public key P◦ = SP
corresponding to the private key S, and chooses a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1;
4. The CA announces H, P◦, PKSHARE, and the keys identities (j’s) corresponding to
the revocation secret keys SKSHARE to all the vehicles.
After the system is initialized, each vehicle should have the following information:
• A short-lifetime certificate;
• A set of m keys;
• The keys identities (j’s) corresponding to the revocation secret keys SKSHARE =
{si|1 ≤ i ≤ x};
• The revocation public keys PKSHARE = {PKSHAREi|1 ≤ i ≤ x};
• The hash function H, P , and the public key P◦.
The main idea of the proposed protocol is to use the revocation secret keys SKSHARE =
{si|1 ≤ i ≤ x} to revoke the PKI certificate of any misbehaving vehicle.
4.3.2 The Revocation Process
A misbehaving vehicle can be revoked as follows.
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1. When a vehicle exhibits a misbehavior, its neighbors vote to revoke the misbehaving
vehicle. The proposed protocol has a modular nature which makes it integrable with
any voting scheme, e.g., the voting scheme proposed in [35]. When the voting exceeds
a predefined threshold, the misbehaving vehicle should be revoked;
2. The vehicle, which accumulates votes exceeding the defined threshold to revoke a
vehicle, takes the role of the revocation coordinator, or one of the neighbors of the
misbehaving vehicle volunteers to take the role of the revocation coordinator;
3. The revocation coordinator broadcasts to its one-hop neighboring vehicles a request
to share in the revocation process, and a message msg containing the certificate of the
misbehaving vehicle, the reason for revocation, the current time-stamp, the revoca-
tion coordinator signature on the entire message msg, and the revocation coordinator
certificate;
4. Any vehicle receiving the request and the message msg, verifies the signature of
the revocation coordinator on msg using the revocation coordinator’s public key
contained in its certificate, and checks the time-stamp to ensure the freshness of the
message msg. In addition, it searches its key set (R) for revocation secret keys belong
to SKSHARE = {si|1 ≤ i ≤ x}. For each possessed revocation secret key, it calculates
its revocation share as Revi = siH(msg) ∈ G1, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , x}, and sends
(i||Revi) to the revocation coordinator;
5. When the revocation coordinator receives any revocation share (i||Revi) calculated by
a revocation secret key i, it uses the corresponding revocation public key (PKsharei =
1
si
P ) to verify the received revocation share by checking that ê(Revi, PKsharei) =
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ê(H(msg), P ). This verification holds since




= ê(H(msg), P )
si· 1si
= ê(H(msg), P )
(4.1)
If the revocation share Revi does not pass the verification, it is immediately rejected
and dropped. Instead of verifying the revocation shares one by one, the revocation
coordinator can wait until the revocation shares corresponding to all the x revocation





Revi, P ) = ê(H(msg), P◦) (4.2)




Revi, P ) = ê(Rev1 +Rev2 + · · ·+Revx, P )
= ê(Rev1, P )ê(Rev2, P ) · · · ê(Revx, P )
= ê(s1H(msg), P )ê(s2H(msg), P ) · · · ê(sxH(msg), P )
= ê(H(msg), P )s1 ê(H(msg)P, P )s2 · · · ê(H(msg), P )sx
= ê(H(msg), P )s1+s2+···+sx
= ê(H(msg), P )S
= ê(H(msg), SP )
= ê(H(msg), P◦)
6. When the revocation coordinator receives and correctly verifies all the required re-
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vocation shares, i.e., Rev1, Rev2, · · · , Revx, the revocation coordinator computes the





The total revocation message signature Rev can be verified as follows
ê(Rev, P ) = ê(H(msg), P◦) (4.3)
The proof of eq. (4.3) follows directly from the proof of eq. (4.2). It should be noted
that the CA is also able to revoke any vehicle using its secret revocation key (S) by
directly calculating the total revocation message signature Rev = SH(msg). The
total revocation message signature issued by the revocation coordinator is identical
to that issued by the CA. Hence, the revocation message signature Rev, generated
by either the CA or the revocation coordinator, can be verified by any vehicle using
the CA public key P◦ as indicated in eq. (4.3). As a result, a vehicle verifying Rev
does not notice any difference between the verification of the revocation messages
transmitted by the revocation coordinators and those transmitted by the CA.
7. The revocation coordinator broadcasts a certificate revocation message Certrev =
{msg||Rev||Tstamp|| sgncoord} to the neighboring vehicles, where Tstamp is the cur-
rent time stamp, and sgncoord is the signature of the revocation coordinator on
(msg||Rev||Tstamp). Note that the certificate of the revocation coordinator is in-
cluded in the message msg;
8. Any vehicle receiving Certrev, checks the freshness of the time stamp Tstamp compared
to that in msg to ensure that the revocation process is done in a timely manner,
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verifies the signature of the coordinator sgncoord using the coordinator’s public key
included in its certificate, and validates Rev as shown in eq. (4.3). Any vehicle
verifying Certrev correctly forwards it to other vehicles. The dissemination of Certrev
continues until the lifetime of the revoked certificate ends;
9. If any RSU captures the message Certrev, it checks the message validity and then,
forwards the message to the CA, which keeps a list of the revoked vehicles.
Since the message Certrev is broadcast to all the vehicles in the neighborhood of the
revoked vehicle, all the neighboring vehicles ignore the messages from the revoked vehicle.
4.3.3 Vehicles Rekeying
All the keys of the revoked vehicles are considered compromised. The rekeying process is
triggered by the CA when the number of the compromised keys in the key pool or when
the number of the compromised revocation secret keys exceeds a predefined threshold. All
the legitimate vehicles must update their compromised keys securely [59]. The rekeying
process is as follows.
1. The CA searches its database to determine the identity (M) of the non-compromised
key kM that is shared by the majority of the non-revoked vehicles. The CA then
generates an intermediate key kim = f(kM) ∈ Z∗q, where f is a family of pseudo-
random functions, which is unique and publicly known to all the network entities.
This intermediate key is used by all the vehicles to update their compromised keys.
Also, the CA calculates the updated revocation public key(s) corresponding to the





P , and its new
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i mod q, where
s8i =
 fkim(si), if si is compromisedsi, otherwise
In addition, the CA calculates its new public key P 8◦ = S
8P . After that, the CA
broadcasts a key update message
Kmsg = (M ||IDrevvehicle||IDrevkey||{PK 8sharei}||P
8
◦)
where IDrevvehicle is the identities of the revoked vehicles, IDrevkey is the identities
of the revoked keys, {PK 8sharei} is the set of updated revocation public keys, and
P 8◦ is the CA new public key corresponding to the new secret key S
8. The CA also
sends with the previous message its signature sgnKmsg = SH(Kmsg) on the message
Kmsg;
2. After receiving the message Kmsg and the signature sgnKmsg, each vehicle verifies
the received message as follows ê(sgnKmsg, P ) = ê(H(Kmsg), P◦). This verification
holds since
ê(sgnKmsg, P ) = ê(SH(Kmsg), P )
= ê(H(Kmsg), SP )
= ê(H(Kmsg), P◦)
If the message is correctly verified, the vehicle checks if it has kM or not. If yes, the
vehicle computes the intermediate key kim independently;
3. If a vehicle v does not have the key kM , it will not be able to update its compromised
104
CHAPTER 4. EDR: EFFICIENT DECENTRALIZED REVOCATION PROTOCOL
FOR VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
keys and must get kim from its neighboring vehicles. The vehicle v broadcasts its
certificate and a request to get kim, and starts its own timer;
4. Any neighboring vehicle of the vehicle v having kim uses the public key of the vehicle
v, included in its certificate, to encrypt the intermediate key kim and sends the
encrypted kim to the vehicle v;
5. If the vehicle v receives the encrypted kim, it uses its secret key to decrypt kim.
Otherwise, if the timer of the vehicle v is timed out without receiving the required
data, then go to step 3;
6. The revoked vehicles cannot compute kim since they do not have kM . Also, they
cannot receive kim from other vehicles since the key update message contains the
identities of the revoked vehicles, which prevents others from forwarding kim to them;
7. If a vehicle possesses a key kj that is contained in the revoked vehicles key sets, i.e.,
compromised key, it updates the compromised key as follows
k8j = fkim(kj);
8. After performing the key set update, each vehicle erases kim, the original compromised
revocation public keys PKsharei ’s, and the original compromised keys kj’s.
Remarks
• Note that if a vehicle missed a rekeying process, it is still able to share in the upcoming
revocation processes since only the compromised keys are updated, hence, it can use
its non-compromised revocation secret key(s) in the future. However, if the number
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of the missed rekeying processes increases, it may be necessary for the vehicle to
contact the CA through RSUs to get the required security materials to update its
key set.
• It is clear that only one key update message is broadcast after several revocations took
place. Consequently, the number of the messages broadcast by the CA is substantially
reduced compared with the centralized revocation scheme, where the CA has to
broadcast a message for each revocation process. It should be noted that the rekeying
process can be done after every revocation process to increase the security level of the
proposed protocol. However, this results in increasing the communication overhead
of the rekeying process.
• It should be noted that the EDR protocol has a modular nature, which makes it
integrable with any PKI system, e.g., the DCS scheme proposed in Chapter 3. In
other words, the proposed protocol does not require any modification to the core of
the PKI architecture but all that is needed to implement the proposed protocol is to
add a KDC to the CA.
• The EDR protocol can be used as a stand alone revocation method or it can co-exist
with the conventional CRL revocation method, where the proposed protocol helps in
revoking the misbehaving vehicles in geographic areas where RSUs are not available.
• The EDR protocol is suitable not only for VANETs but also for any type of networks
employing PKI.
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Table 4.1: EDR notations
Symbol Notation
l the key pool size of the key server
m the key set size stored in each vehicle
N the number of the collaborating vehicles to revoke a vehicle
x the number of the revocation secret keys
Px the probability of having at least one key of x
Prev the revocation success probability
w the number of revoked keys
Phalf the probability that at least half of the x keys are safe
when there are w keys revoked
Prev(w) the probability that the revocation is successful and
it is performed with at least (x/2) non-compromised
revocation secret keys
4.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the EDR protocol in terms of its feasibility
and reliability. The notations used throughout the rest of this section are given in Table
4.1.
4.4.1 The Probability of Having at Least One Revocation Secret
Key
The probability Px of having at least one key of the revocation secret keys (x) in the key











Fig. 4.2 shows Px as a function in x. It can be seen that Px increases as x and m
increase and l decreases. This can be explained as follows. For a fixed x, the probability
that a vehicle has at least one revocation secret key increases with the number of keys (m)
a vehicle gets from the key pool. Similar analogy applies to the number of the revocation
secret keys x and the key pool size l. Therefore, a desired value for Px can be achieved by
appropriately selecting the values of l, m, and x.
4.4.2 Revocation Success Probability
In this section, we are interested in calculating the revocation success probability Prev,
which is defined as the probability that any N collaborating vehicles have all the required














Fig. 4.3 shows the relation between the revocation success probability (Prev) and the
number of the collaborating vehicles (N) for different values of l, m, and x. It can be seen
that for constant l, m, and x, Prev increases as N increases. Generally speaking, the value
of N should be set according to the real-life measurements of the average number of vehicles
within the communication range of a vehicle. Also, it can be seen that Prev increases as
the vehicle key set size (m) increases and the size of the key pool (l) decreases. This is
due to the fact that increasing m or decreasing l increases the probability Px of having
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l= 500, m= 50
l= 500, m= 100
l= 1000, m= 50
Figure 4.2: The probability (Px) of having at least one key out of x in the key set of a
vehicle.
at least one revocation secret key in the key set of a vehicle, as it can seen in Fig. 4.2,
hence, increasing the probability for each vehicle of the neighbors of a misbehaving vehicle
to share in the revocation process, which increases the revocation success probability Prev.
However, increasing the value of m results in increasing the vulnerability of the system
because the more keys a single vehicle has, the more information an attacker can get
by compromising a single vehicle. Also, decreasing the value of l results in lowering the
security because an attacker gets more information about the key pool if a few number of
vehicles are compromised.
From the above discussion, the values of l, m, N, x, and the desired security level
should be carefully selected in order to get the desired value of Prev.
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Figure 4.3: The revocation success probability Prev.
4.4.3 The Impact of the Number of the Revoked Keys
In this section, we study the effect of revoking w keys on the safety of the revocation secret
keys and the revocation success probability.
To ensure the correctness of the revocation process, we set the following requirement:
at least half of the revocation secret keys sharing in the revocation of a vehicle must be
non-compromised. It should be noted that the keys of any revoked vehicle are considered
compromised. The probability Phalf that at least half of the x revocation secret keys are
safe can be calculated as a function of the number of the revoked keys w as follows
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Fig. 4.4 shows the relation between Phalf and the number of the revoked keys w. It can
be seen that changing x has a slight effect on Phalf because the number of the revocation
secret keys (x) is relatively small compared with the number of keys (l) in the key pool,
which alleviates the effect of revoking keys from the key pool on the safety of the revocation
secret keys. Also, Phalf decreases as w increases, and Phalf increases as l increases.
The probability Prev(w) that the revocation is successful and it is performed by at least
(x/2) non-compromised revocation secret keys is as follows.
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)) l= 500, m=50, x=50, N=50
l= 500, ,m=50, x=100, N=50
l= 500, ,m=100, x=50, N=70
l= 500, ,m=50, x=50, N=70
l= 1000, ,m=100, x=50, N=70
Figure 4.5: The revocation success probability with at least half of the revocation secret
keys being safe.



























Fig. 4.5 shows the relation between Prev(w) and w. It can be seen that Prev(w) decreases
as w increases. Also, Prev(w) increases as m and N increase, and Prev(w) decreases as l
and x increase.
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Table 4.2: NS-2 simulation parameters for EDR
simulation area 13.4 Km× 12.3 Km
simulation time 100 sec
max. vehicle speed 60 Km/h
vehicle transmission range 300 m
vehicle information dissemination interval 300 msec
number of vehicles 4486
wired channel capacity 100 Mbps
wireless channel capacity 6 Mbps
number of RSUs 576
distribution of RSUs uniform
key pool size l 500
vehicle key set size m 100
number of revocation secret keys x 20
4.4.4 Revocation Delay
In this section, we evaluate the revocation delay of the EDR protocol and the conventional
CRL by conducting ns-2 [47] simulation for the city street scenario shown in Fig. 4.6. The
adopted simulation parameters are given in Table 4.2. The mobility traces adopted in this
simulation are generated using TraNS [48].
VANETs have two types of links: wireless links connecting vehicles to each other and to
the RSUs and wired links connecting the RSUs and the CA as shown in Fig. 4.7. According
to the DSRC specifications, each wireless data channel in VANET has a bandwidth of
10 MHz corresponding to channel data rate in the range of 3 Mbps − 27 Mbps [50]. We
select a data rate of 6 Mbps for the wireless channels in VANET. RSUs are connected via
Ethernet to the CA [2]. We consider the links of the Ethernet connecting the RSUs and CA
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Figure 4.6: A city street simulation scenario
to have data rate of 100 Mbps. The RSUs connection pattern employed in our simulation
is shown in Fig. 4.8. The adopted RSU connection considers a well deployed VANET,
where the RSUs are uniformly distributed with the distance between any pair of adjacent
RSUs is 500 m. The CA is located at the top left corner of the city scenario shown in Fig.
4.6. To simulate real-life revocation scenarios, we conduct revocation scenarios imposed
on VANET safety-related applications, where each vehicle has to disseminate information
about the road condition every 300 msec according to DSRC.
In the conducted simulation, we consider the cryptography delay only due to pairing and
point multiplication operations on an elliptic curve as they are the most time consuming
operations in the proposed protocol and the conventional CRL. Let Tpair and Tmul denote
the time required to perform a pairing operation and a point multiplication, respectively.
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RSU RSU
CA
Misbehaving vehicle to be revoked
Voting indicates that vehicle v should be revoked 
Vehicle uVehicle v
Link of data rate100 Mbps
Link of data rate 6 Mbps
Transmission range of vehicle v
Vehicle DVehicle C Vehicle BVehicle A
Ethernet
Vehicle FVehicle HVehicle EVehicle G
Figure 4.7: Different revocation scenarios
In [26], Tpair and Tmul are found for an MNT curve with embedding degree k = 6 to be
equal to 4.5 msec, and 0.6 msec, respectively. ECDSA [51] is the digital signature method
chosen by the VANET standard IEEE1609.2, where a certificate and signature verification
takes 4Tmul, and a signature generation takes Tmul.
We consider two revocation scenarios as shown in Fig. 4.7. The first scenario is the
conventional CRL revocation method combined with a generic voting scheme. In Fig.
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Figure 4.8: RSUs connection pattern
4.7, vehicle u is misbehaving, and the accumulation of the votes in vehicle v reaches the
threshold where a revocation of vehicle u should be performed. Hence, vehicle v should
send a revocation request to the CA via the nearest RSU. After the request reaches the
nearest RSU, the request will be forwarded through the RSUs’ Ethernet to the CA, where
the request message experiences a delay of 4Tmul at each intermediate RSU, as each RSU
has to verify the certificate and the signature of the sender before forwarding the request.
When the revocation request reaches the CA, it has to verify the request which takes 4Tmul,
and generate a new signed CRL which takes Tmul. In VANETs, the most important issue in
any revocation method is the delay of delivering the revocation message to the neighboring
vehicles of a misbehaving vehicle to prevent that misbehaving vehicle from jeopardizing
the safety of its neighbors. Consequently, the CRL total revocation delay TCRL is the delay
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from the moment a vehicle issues a revocation request until the moment the new CRL is
broadcast in the geographic area containing vehicle u.
The second scenario is the EDR protocol. In Fig. 4.7, when the accumulation of
the votes in vehicle v exceeds the threshold where a revocation of vehicle u should be
performed, vehicle v acts as the revocation coordinator and sends a revocation request to
the neighboring vehicles located within one hop connectivity (vehicles A, B, C, · · · , and
H in Fig. 4.7). Any vehicle receiving the revocation request and having a revocation secret
key verifies the request which takes 4Tmul, calculates its revocation share Revi which takes
Tmul, and broadcasts its revocation share. When the revocation coordinator receives the
required revocation shares to calculate the final revocation message of vehicle u, it verifies
all the revocation shares using eq. (4.2) which takes 2Tpair + Tmul, then, it calculates the
final revocation message. Finally, vehicle v broadcasts the final revocation messages to
its neighboring vehicles. Consequently, the EDR revocation delay TEDR is the delay from
the moment the revocation coordinator issues a revocation request until the moment the
revocation of vehicle v is broadcast in the geographic area containing vehicle u.
Fig. 4.9 shows the CRL revocation delay TCRL and the EDR revocation delay TEDR in
msec vs. the simulation time. We conducted simulation for the two revocation scenarios
triggered by the vehicle v at three different locations: location1, location2, and location3
corresponding to initial distances of 2.7Km, 4.7Km, and 10.3Km, respectively, from the
CA at the beginning of the simulation. The revocation process is triggered every 10 sec
during the simulation and the corresponding revocation delay is measured. The variations
in TCRL is due to the number of the intermediate RSUs existing in the connection between
the CA and the vehicle sending the revocation request. Also, the variations in TEDR are due
to the variation in the number of the neighboring vehicles of the revocation coordinator. It
can be seen that TEDR is almost the same for the three locations, and is confined within the
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Figure 4.9: The revocation delay for different revocation scenarios
range 21msec− 35msec. This is due to the fact that the proposed protocol is independent
on the CA. On the other hand, it can be seen that TCRL increases with the distance
from the CA. Consequently, the delay-saving of the proposed EDR protocol compared to
the conventional CRL revocation increases with distance from the CA. For example, the
average CRL revocation delay is 59.87 msec for location2, while that for the EDR protocol
is 28.83 msec. Consequently, the EDR protocol decreases the revocation delay by 51.85%
compared to the conventional CRL in that case. It should be noted that TEDR and TCRL
are corresponding to the vulnerability window that a misbehaving vehicle has until it is
revoked for the EDR protocol and CRL, respectively. During the vulnerability window,
the misbehaving vehicle can still jeopardize the safety of the neighboring vehicles. It can
be seen that the EDR protocol has a small vulnerability window compared to the CRL
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technique, which increases the safety level in VANET.
4.5 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the proposed protocol against the achieved security objectives
in section 4.2.3. It should be noted that these security objectives are the most common
revocation attacks.
Resistance to forging attacks
To forge the revocation share Revi = siH(msg) of any vehicle, an attacker has to solve the
following ECDLP problem: given H(msg) and Revi, find si such that Revi = siH(msg).
Similar analogy applies to finding the CA secret key S from the total revocation message
signature Rev = SH(msg). Since ECDLP is a hard computational problem, i.e., it cannot
be solved in a sub-exponential time, the revocation shares and the total revocation message
signature Rev are unforgeable. Similarly, finding the CA secret value S from P◦ = SP is
ECDLP problem, which makes it unforgeable. Furthermore, the revocation request, sent
by the revocation coordinator to his neighboring vehicles, is unforgeable since this request
is signed by the revocation coordinator. From the aforementioned discussion, the EDR
protocol is resistant to forging attacks.
Resistance to collusion attacks
According to the EDR protocol, the rekeying process is performed before the number of
the compromised revocation secret keys exceed half the total number of the revocation
secret keys. Therefore, it is guaranteed that the revoked vehicles can never have all the
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revocation secret keys, hence, they cannot collude to revoke any vehicle. Consequently,
the EDR protocol is resistant to collusion attacks. Moreover, the key update in each
vehicle depends mainly on the intermediate key kim which cannot be generated by any
revoked vehicle. Also, any compromised vehicle cannot lead to the old kim’s since after
each rekeying process, each vehicle erases the current kim. As a result, the revoked vehicles
are able to neither update their keys nor share in future revocation processes.
Resistance to internal revocation-denial attacks
If a legitimate vehicle deliberately sends an erroneous revocation share in order to fail
the revocation process, the revocation coordinator immediately detects and discards the
erroneous revocation share as it will fail to pass the revocation share verification in eq.
(4.1). In addition, since the EDR protocol adopts a probabilistic key distribution technique,
the same revocation secret key may be found with more than one vehicle. Consequently,
the revocation coordinator may receive multiple copies of the same revocation share Revi
alleviating the effect of a vehicle intentionally choosing not to send its revocation share.
Hence, the EDR protocol exhibits robust performance against internal revocation-denial
attacks.
Resistance to external revocation-denial attacks
If an external attacker tries to send a fake revocation share during the revocation process,
the revocation coordinator will immediately detect and exclude the fake revocation share
as it will fail to pass the revocation share verification in eq. (4.1). Consequently, the EDR
protocol is resistant to external revocation-denial attacks.
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4.6 Integrating DCS and EDR
The EDR protocol presented in this Chapter can be integrated with the DCS scheme
presented in Chapter 3 as follows.
• During the system initialization in the DCS scheme, the MA generates a key pool,
selects x random revocation secret keys from that key pool, and calculates the cor-
responding revocation public keys as indicated in subsection 4.3.1.
• The MA copies the key pool and the random revocation secret keys in each CA.
• During the initialization of the OBUs, each OBU randomly selects m keys from the
key pool of its in charge CA. Also, each CA loads in each OBU the keys identities
corresponding to the revocation secret keys and the revocation public keys.
• Whenever a misbehaving vehicle is detected, the revocation process can be done as
indicated in subsection 4.3.2.
• Since the key pool and the revocation secret keys are the same in each CA, the OBUs
can roam between different domains and still be able to share in the revocation process
in any domain.
• The rekeying process is preformed individually by each CA.
• The integrated DCS and EDR offer an efficient PKI management.
4.7 Summary
In this Chapter, we have proposed a robust and efficient decentralized revocation (EDR)
protocol for VANETs, which substantially reduces the complexity of the certificate revo-
121
4.7. SUMMARY
cation problem, while achieving fast revocation of the misbehaving vehicles. The EDR
protocol decreases the vulnerability window that a misbehaving vehicle has resulting in
higher safety level for VANET. The EDR protocol is resistant to the most known revoca-
tion attacks. In addition, it can be efficiently integrated with any PKI, such as the DCS
scheme proposed in Chapter 3, and/or any misbehavior detection scheme for VANETs.
The DCS and EDR schemes can provide the targeted efficient PKI management to provide





As discussed in Chapter 2, PKI is a prominent candidate for securing VANETs, how-
ever, it cannot provide important security services such as location privacy and expedite
authentication. In this Chapter, we propose complementing PKI with group communi-
cation to achieve location privacy and expedite message authentication. In specific, the
proposed complemented PKI features the following. First, it employs a probabilistic key
distribution to establish a shared secret group key between non-revoked OBUs. Second,
it uses the shared secret group key to perform expedite message authentication (EMAP)
which replaces the time-consuming CRL checking process by an efficient revocation check-
ing process. Third, it uses the shared secret group key to provide novel location privacy
preservation through random encryption periods (REP) which ensures that the require-
ments to track a vehicle are always violated. Moreover, in case of revocation an OBU can
calculate the new group key and update its compromised keys even if the OBU missed
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previous rekeying process. By conducting detailed analysis and simulation, the proposed
complemented PKI is demonstrated to be reliable, efficient, and scalable.
5.1 Introduction
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a well-recognized solution to secure VANETs. How-
ever, PKI cannot provide vital security services for VANETs such as location privacy and
expedite authentication.
Traditional PKI uses Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for managing the revoked
certificates. In PKI, each entity in the network holds an authentic certificate, and every
message should be digitally signed before its transmission. A CRL, usually issued by a
Trusted Authority (TA), is a list containing all the revoked certificates. In a PKI system,
the authentication of any message is performed by first checking if the sender’s certificate
is included in the current CRL, i.e., checking its revocation status, then, verifying the
sender’s certificate, and finally verifying the sender’s signature on the received message.
In Chapter 3, we proposed batch verification to expedite the second and the third parts.
The first part of the authentication, which checks the revocation status of the sender in a
CRL, may incur long delay depending on the CRL size and the employed mechanism for
searching the CRL. Unfortunately, the CRL size in VANETs is expected to be large for the
following reasons: (1) To preserve the privacy of the drivers, i.e., to abstain the leakage of
the real identities and location information of the drivers from any external eavesdropper
[6][7], each OBU should be preloaded with a set of anonymous digital certificates, where
the OBU has to periodically change its anonymous certificate to mislead attackers [4].
Consequently, a revocation of an OBU results in revoking all the certificates carried by
that OBU leading to a large increase in the CRL size; (2) The scale of VANET is very
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large. According to the United States Bureau of Transit Statistics, there are approximately
251 million OBUs in the Unites States in 2006 [60]. Since the number of the OBUs is huge
and each OBU has a set of certificates, the CRL size will increase dramatically if only a
small portion of the OBUs is revoked. To have an idea of how large the CRL size can be,
consider the case where only 100 OBUs are revoked, and each OBU has 25, 000 certificates
[61]. In this case, the CRL contains 2.5 million revoked certificates. According to the
employed mechanism for searching a CRL, the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) standard [2] does not state that either a non-optimized search algorithm, e.g.,
linear search, or some sort of optimized search algorithm such as binary search, will be
used for searching a CRL. In this Chapter, we consider both non-optimized and optimized
search algorithms.
According to the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [3], which is part
of the WAVE standard, each OBU has to broadcast a message every 300 msec about
its location, velocity, and other telematic information. In such scenario, each OBU may
receive a large number of messages every 300 msec, and it has to check the current CRL
for all the received certificates, which may incur long authentication delay depending on
the CRL size and the number of received certificates. The ability to check a CRL for a
large number of certificates in a timely manner leads an inevitable challenge to VANETs.
To ensure reliable operation of VANETs and increase the amount of authentic informa-
tion gained from the received messages, each OBU should be able to check the revocation
status of all the received certificates in a timely manner. Most of the existing works
overlooked the authentication delay resulting from checking the CRL for each received
certificate.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, PKI and anonymous authentication cannot provide
location privacy as an eavesdropper may still able to track a vehicle [30][62][6][63][64][7][21].
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Figure 5.1: Hash chain
Consequently, PKI should be complemented to provide location privacy. One possible
solution to achieve location privacy for VANETs is to prevent attackers from gaining any
useful information from the periodically multicasted messages.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, preliminaries are
presented. The proposed protocols are introduced in section 5.3. The security analysis
and performance evaluation are presented in sections 5.7 and 5.8, respectively. Section 5.9
discusses how to complement DCS with EMAP and REP. The summary of the Chapter is
introduced in section 5.10.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Hash Chains
A hash chain [65] is the successive application of a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q with
a secret value as its input. A hash function is easy and efficient to compute, but it is
computationally infeasible to invert. Fig. 5.1 shows the application of a hash chain to a
secret value v, where v0 = v, vi = h(vi−1) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
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5.2.2 Search Algorithms
The WAVE standard does not consider a specific mechanism for searching CRLs to check
the revocation status of certificates. The most common search algorithms [66] include
non-optimized search algorithms such as linear search algorithm, and optimized search
algorithms such as binary search algorithm and lookup hash tables. The basic concept of
each algorithm is as follows.
Linear Search Algorithm
In the linear search algorithm, the revocation status of a certificate is checked by comparing
the certificate with each entry in the CRL. If a match occurs, the certificate is revoked and
vice versa.
Binary Search Algorithm
The binary search algorithm works only on sorted lists. Consequently, upon receiving a
new CRL, each OBU has to maintain a sorted (with respect to the certificate’s identity)
database of the revoked certificates included in previous CRLs and the recently received
CRL. The main idea of the binary search algorithm is to cancel out half of the entries
under consideration after each comparison in the search process. In the binary search, the
revocation status of a certificate is checked by comparing the identity of the certificate with
middle value (which in this case will be the median value) of the sorted database. If the
identity of the certificate is greater than the median value, the right half of the database
will be considered in the next comparison process and vice versa. This process continues
until a match is found, i.e., the certificate is revoked, or the process is finished without




In this approach, the set of all possible certificates (U) is mapped using a hash function
into a table of n entries. To check the revocation status of a certificate, the hash of the
certificate’s identity is the index of the entry in the lookup table which should be checked
to determine the revocation status of the certificate. If nil is found in that entry, the
certificate under consideration is unrevoked and vice versa. Since VANETs scale is very
large and each OBU has a set of certificates, the size of U will be huge compared to the
size (n) of the lookup table. Consequently, the probability of hash collisions will be high,
which directly translates to a high probability of false positives. Here, a false positive
means that the certificate of an innocent OBU is falsely considered revoked which results
in rejecting all the messages containing the certificate of that OBU. The rejected messages
may include a warning from dangerous situations. Hence, rejecting these messages may
deprive the recipient OBU from taking the appropriate countermeasures to ensure its safety.
Accordingly, lookup hash tables may not be practical for VANETs. Hence, lookup hash
tables will not be considered in this Chapter. It should be noted that hash functions which
map an input to one entry of possible n entries used in the lookup tables, are different
from cryptographic hash functions which map an input to a unique output. Throughout
the rest of the Chapter, the considered hash functions are cryptographic hash functions.
5.2.3 Location Privacy Threat Model
We consider an external passive global observer, which can overhear and correlate any
message broadcast in clear in the network. The anonymity set is defined as the set of
all possible OBUs which simultaneously change their anonymous certificate between two
observation points controlled by an attacker [29]. Consider an OBU moving between two
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Attacker’s first observation pointAttacker’s second observation point
Vehicle using certificate cert2 Vehicle using certificate cert1The capturing range of the observation points
Time t1t2t2 > t1
Figure 5.2: The threat model
observation points controlled by the global observer as shown in Fig. 5.2 [30]. The ob-
server can track an OBU if two anonymous certificates can be correctly correlated. This
correlation can be achieved by capturing at least one message at each observation point
from the OBU, while it is moving with the same speed and in the same lane for some
distance between observation points controlled by the observer. For example, a message
is captured at the first observation point at time t1 from an OBU moving with speed v,
in lane L, and using anonymous certificate cert1. Given the speed of the OBU and the
distance between the two observation points, the observer can expect the time t2 to receive
a message from that OBU at the second observation point. If a message is captured at the
second observation point at time t2 from an OBU moving with the same speed v, in lane
L, and using anonymous certificate cert2, the observer can conclude that cert1 and cert2
belong to the same OBU. Also, if the OBU under attack is the only OBU, which changes
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its certificate in the area between the two observation points, i.e., it has anonymity set size
equals one, the observer can track that OBU even if it changes its speed or lane. It can
be seen from the threat model that location privacy can be achieved only if the anonymity
set size is greater than one and the OBUs, which changed their certificates, change their
speeds and/or their lane locations. In addition, it can be seen that periodically changing
the anonymous certificate of each OBU in PKI security architectures is insufficient to pro-
vide location privacy for VANETs. Consequently, PKI architectures should be combined
with other methods to achieve robust location privacy.
5.3 The Proposed Complemented PKI
In this section, we introduce the proposed security architecture.
5.3.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 5.3, the system model under consideration consists of the followings.
• A Trusted Authority (TA), which is responsible for providing anonymous certificates
and distributing secret keys to all OBUs in the network;
• Roadside units (RSUs), which are fixed units distributed all over the network. The
RSUs can communicate securely with the TA;
• On-Board Units (OBUs), which are embedded in vehicles. OBUs can communicate
either with other OBUs through V2V communications or with RSUs through V2I
communications.
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Figure 5.3: The system model
According to the WAVE standard [2], each OBU is equipped with a Hardware Security
Module (HSM), which is a tamper-resistant module used to store the security materials,
e.g., secret keys, certificates, etc., of the OBU. Also, the HSM in each OBU is responsible for
performing all the cryptographic operations such as signing messages, verifying certificates,
keys updating, etc. We consider that legitimate OBUs cannot collude with the revoked
OBUs as it is difficult for legitimate OBUs to extract their security materials from their
HSMs. Finally, we consider that a compromised OBU is instantly detected by the TA.
5.3.2 System Initialization
The TA initializes the system by executing Algorithm 4. In step (20), it should be noted
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Algorithm 4 System initialization
1: Select two generators P, Q ∈ G1 of order q,
2: for i← 1, l do
3: Select a random number ki ∈ Z∗q
4: Set the secret key K−i = kiQ ∈ G1





7: Select an initial secret group key Kg ∈ G2 . to be shared between all the non-revoked
OBUs
8: Select a master secret key s ∈ Z∗q
9: Set the corresponding public key P◦ = sP
10: Choose hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
11: Select a secret value v ∈ Z∗q and set v◦ = v
12: for i← 1, j do . to obtain a set V of hash chain values
13: Set vi = h(vi−1)
14: end for
15: for all OBUu in the network, TA do
16: for i← 1,m do
17: Select a random number a ∈ [1, l]






in HSMu which is the HSM embedded in OBUu
19: end for
20: Generate a set of anonymous certificates CERTu = {certiu(PID iu ,
PK iu , sigTA(PID
i
u ||PK iu))|1 ≤ i ≤ C} . for privacy-preserving authentication
21: Upload CERTu in HSMu of OBUu
22: end for
23: Announce H, h, P, Q, and P◦ to all the OBUs
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that: PK iu denotes the i
th public key for OBUu , where the corresponding secret key is SK
i
u ;
PID iu denotes the i
th pseudo identity for OBUu , where the TA is the only entity that can
relate PID iu to the real identity of OBUu ; sigTA(PID
i
u ||PK iu) denotes the TA signature on
the concatenation (||) of PID iu and PK iu ; and C is the number of certificates loaded in each
OBU.
After the system is initialized, the TA has the followings:
• A secret key pool Us = {K−i = kiQ|1 ≤ i ≤ l};
• The corresponding public key set Up = {K+i = 1kiP |1 ≤ i ≤ l};
• A master secret key s and the corresponding public key P◦;
• The secret group key Kg;
• A set of hash chain values V = {vi|0 ≤ i ≤ j}, where j is large enough to accom-
modate with the number of revocation processes occur during the life-time of the
network;
• The public parameters H, h, P , and Q.
Also, each OBU will have the followings:
• A set of anonymous certificates (CERTu) used to achieve privacy-preserving authen-
tication;
• A set of secret keys RSu consisting of m keys randomly selected from Us, i.e., RSu ⊂
Us;
• The set of the public keys RPu corresponding to the keys in RSu, i.e., RPu ⊂ Up;
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• The secret key Kg, which is shared between all the legitimate OBUs;
• The hash function H, h, P , Q, and the public key P◦.
Note that the system model under consideration is mainly a PKI system, where each
OBUu has a set of anonymous certificates (CERTu) used to secure its communications with
other entities in the network. In specific, the public key PKu , included in the certificate
certu , and the secret key SKu are used for verifying and signing messages, respectively.
Also, each OBUu is pre-loaded with a set of asymmetric keys (secret keys K
−’s in RSu
and the corresponding public keys K+’s in RPu). Those keys are necessary for generating
and maintaining a shared secret group key Kg between unrevoked OBUs. It should be
noted also that the secret group key Kg can be used in any application to secure the
communication between OBUs.
5.4 Expedite Message Authentication (EMAP)
The proposed EMAP uses a fast HMAC function and the established shared secret group
key Kg.
5.4.1 Message Authentication
Since we adopt a generic PKI system, the details of the TA signature on a certificate and
an OBU signature on a message are not discussed in this Chapter for the sake of generality.
We only focus in how to accelerate the revocation checking process, which is conventionally
performed by checking the CRL for every received certificate. The message signing and
verification between different entities in the network are performed as follows.
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Message Signing
Before any OBUu broadcasts a message M, it calculates its revocation check REVcheck
as REVcheck = HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp) 1, where Tstamp is the current time stamp, and
HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp) is the hash message authentication code on the concatenation of
PIDu and Tstamp using the secret key Kg. Then, OBUu broadcasts (M||Tstamp||certu(PIDu ,
PKu , sigTA(PIDu ||PKu))||sigu(M||Tstamp)||REVcheck), where sigu(M||Tstamp) is the signa-
ture of OBUu on the concatenation of the message M and Tstamp.
Message Verification
Any OBUy receiving the message (M||Tstamp||certu(PIDu ,PKu , sigTA(PIDu ||PKu))||
sigu(M||Tstamp)||REVcheck) can verify it by executing Algorithm 5. In step (5), OBUy
calculates HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp) using its Kg on the concatenation PIDu ||Tstamp, and
compares the calculated HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp) with the received REVcheck.
5.5 Achieving Location Privacy Using Random En-
cryption Period (REP)
Each OBU has a set of anonymous certificates used to achieve authentication, non-repudiation,
and liability. According to the previous threat model, although each OBU periodically
changes its anonymous certificate to protect its privacy, it still can be tracked by a global
observer. To overcome this tracking attack, when an OBU needs to change its certificate,
1It should be noted that throughout the rest of the Chapter the superscript i will be removed from
PID iu and PK
i
u for the ease of presentation.
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Algorithm 5 Message verification
Require: (M||Tstamp||certu(PIDu ,PKu , sigTA(PIDu ||PKu))||sigu(M||Tstamp)|| REVcheck)
and Kg
1: Check the validity of Tstamp
2: if invalid then




= HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp)
6: if invalid then
7: Drop the message
8: else
9: Verify the TA signature on certOBUu
10: if invalid then
11: Drop the message
12: else
13: Verify the signature sigu(M||Tstamp) using OBUu public key (PKu)
14: if invalid then
15: Drop the message
16: else





it uses the secret group key shared between legitimate OBUs to surround itself by an
encrypted zone with the aid of its neighboring OBUs.
5.5.1 Random Encryption Periods
From the threat model previously discussed, location privacy can be achieved only if the
anonymity set size of the OBUs changing their certificates is greater than one, and those
OBUs change their speeds and/or their lane locations. The main idea of the proposed
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random encryption periods is to provide location privacy for an OBU changing its certificate
by ensuring that the aforementioned conditions are met. Random encryption period is
triggered when an OBU needs to change its certificate. The random encryption period
uses the secret group key Kg, shared between all the OBUs, to create an encryption zone
around the OBU which needs to change its certificate as follows:
• Any OBUi, before changing its certificate, sends a message msg = {requestREP
||PIDi||TREP} to its neighbors moving in the same direction to announce itself as
the random encryption period coordinator, where requestREP is a request to start a
random encryption period in the transmission range of OBUi, PIDi is the pseudo
ID of OBUi, and TREP is a random time specifying the encryption duration;
• All the OBUs receiving msg start encrypting their broadcast messages using the
group key Kg. We term the OBUs encrypting their messages as the encryption
group;
• After encryption starts, OBUi starts monitoring all the OBUs in the encryption
group. Also, it changes its certificate;
• Any OBU in the encryption group checks the remaining validity period of its current
certificate. If the remaining validity period is less than TREP , it changes its certificate
immediately;
• OBUi monitors the encryption group for the following conditions:
1. more than one OBU in the encryption group change their certificates;
2. the OBUs which changed their certificates change their speeds;
3. the OBUs which changed their certificates change their lanes or directions;
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If the first condition and either the second or the third condition is met by the end of
TREP , OBUi terminates the encryption period by broadcasting a message informing
the encryption group to stop encrypting their messages. It should be noted that the
required anonymity set size can be increased in the first condition to increase the
location privacy level;
• If the conditions to terminate the encryption period are not met before TREP , OBUi
broadcasts another msg requesting to extend the encryption period.
It should be noted that any legitimate OBU outside the encryption group can decrypt
the received messages since it has Kg. Also, it can be seen that random encryption period
prevents the global observer from overhearing messages in the areas where a certificate
update takes place, hence, decreasing the probability of tracking an OBU.
5.6 Revocation and Rekeying
The revocation is triggered by the TA when there is an OBUu to be revoked. The cer-
tificates of OBUu must be revoked. In addition, the secret key set RSu of OBUu and the
current secret group key Kg are considered revoked. Hence, a new secret group key K̃g
should be securely distributed to all the non-revoked OBUs. Also, each non-revoked OBU
should securely update the compromised keys in its key sets RS and RP [59], which is
called the rekeying process. The revocation and rekeying processes are as follows.
1. The TA searches its database to determine the identity (M) of the non-compromised
secret key K−M = kMQ that is shared by the majority of the non-revoked OBUs,
and finds the corresponding public key K+M =
1
kM
P . The TA then selects a random
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number t ∈ Z∗q, and calculates the intermediate key Kim = tK+M = tkM P ∈ G1, and












Also, it selects the value vj−ver of the hash chain values, where vj is the last value in
the hash chain as shown in Fig. 5.1, and ver is an integer indicating the revocation
version, i.e., the number of the revocation processes performed since the network
initialization. The value vj−ver is used by all the OBUs to update their compromised
secret keys and the corresponding public keys. After that, the TA prepares a key
update message Kmsg = (ver||M ||IDrevkey||Kim||encK̃g(vj−ver)), where IDrevkey is
a list of the identities of the revoked keys, and encK̃g(vj−ver) is the symmetric encryp-
tion of vj−ver using the key K̃g. Finally, the TA broadcasts the following message
REVmsg = (CRL||Kmsg ||sigTA(CRL||Kmsg)), where CRL is a list of the certificates
of the revoked OBUs, and sigTA(CRL||Kmsg) = sH(CRL||Kmsg) is the TA signature
on CRL||Kmsg ;
2. After receiving the message REVmsg, each OBUy executes Algorithm 6;
3. In Algorithm 6 step (1), OBUy verifies the signature sigTA(CRL||Kmsg) by checking
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that ê(sigTA(CRL||Kmsg), P )
?
= ê(H(CRL||Kmsg), P◦). This check follows since
ê(sigTA(CRL||Kmsg), P ) = ê(sH(CRL||Kmsg), P )
= ê(H(CRL||Kmsg), sP )
= ê(H(CRL||Kmsg), P◦)
Algorithm 6 Processing revocation messages
Require: REVmsg = (CRL||Kmsg ||sigTA(CRL||Kmsg)) and P◦




2: if invalid then
3: Exit
4: else
5: Run Algorithm 7 to get K̃g and vj−ver
6: Run Algorithm 8 to update the key set of OBUy
7: end if
8: Store ver and IDrevkey
9: Erase Kim, the hash chain values, and the original compromised secret and public keys.
4. OBUy has to execute Algorithm 7 to get K̃g and vj−ver. If OBUy has K
−
M , it can
independently calculate K̃g according to step (2). Otherwise, OBUy gets K̃g from its
neighboring OBUs as indicated in steps (5-15);
5. In Algorithm 7, the revoked OBUs cannot compute K̃g since they do not have K
−
M .
Also, they cannot receive K̃g from other OBUs since the recent CRL sent in REVmsg
contains the certificates of the revoked OBUs, which stops others from forwarding
K̃g to them;
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Algorithm 7 Obtaining K̃g and vj−ver
1: if K−M exists in RSy then
2: Set the new secret group key K̃g = ê(K
−
M , Kim)
3: Decrypt encK̃g(vj−ver) using K̃g to get vj−ver
4: else
5: Broadcast a signed request and certy(PIDy ,PKy , sigTA(PIDy ||PKy)) to get K̃g from
neighboring OBUs
6: Start a timer T1
7: Any neighboring OBU of OBUy having K̃g verifies the signature and certificate of
OBUy , ensures that certy is not in the recent CRL, uses the public key (PKy) of
OBUy included in certy to encrypt K̃g, and sends the encrypted K̃g to OBUy
8: if the encrypted K̃g is received then
9: Decrypt K̃g using the secret key corresponding to PKy
10: Decrypt encK̃g(vj−ver) using K̃g to get vj−ver
11: else
12: if T1 is timed out then




6. OBUy has to execute Algorithm 8 to update its key sets RSy and RPy . If OBUy
did not miss any previous revocation messages, it updates its key sets as indicated
in steps (3-4). If OBUy missed a number of previous revocation messages, it can
update its key sets as indicated in steps (9-22). It should be noted that in step (14),
ver|missed and IDrevkey|missed denote the revocation version and the list of identities
of the revoked keys of a missed revocation process, respectively;
7. It should be noted that in Algorithm 7 step (7) and in Algorithm 8 step (16) one
of the communicating parties do not have the new key K̃g. Accordingly, the OBUs
must use the CRL to check that the certificates of the communicating parties are not
previously revoked.
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Algorithm 8 Rekeying OBUy (Updating the key sets of OBUy)
Require: K̃g and vj−ver
1: if not previously missing any revocation message then
2: if possesses compromised secret keys {K−i } = {kiQ} in IDrevkey then
















9: Set n = ver
10: while n 6= vverlast do . verlast is the last received revocation version
11: Set vj−n+1 = h(vj−n)
12: Set n = ver + 1
13: end while . this loop outputs {vj−ver+1, vj−ver+2, · · · , vverlast−1}
14: Broadcast a signed request to the neighboring OBUs requesting ver|missed and
IDrevkey|missed for all the missed revocation processes
15: for each received signed value of ver|missed do
16: Verify the signature and certificate of the sender and, ensures that the certificate
of the sender is not in the recent CRL
17: Find the value of vj−ver|missed from {vj−ver+1, vj−ver+2, · · · , vverlast−1}
18: for each possessed key K−i = kiQ ∈ IDrevkey|missed do
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Remarks
• To perform the revocation and rekeying process the TA needs to send one message
only irrespective of the number of the OBUs in the network.
• An important feature of the proposed complemented PKI is that it enables an OBU to
update its compromised keys corresponding to previously missed revocation processes
provided that it picks one revocation process in the future. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to propose a rekeying mechanism capable of updating
compromised keys corresponding to previously missed rekeying processes.
• Note that the proposed complementing mechanisms have a modular feature, which
makes them integrable with any PKI system. In other words, the proposed comple-
menting mechanisms for PKI do not require any modification to the core of the PKI
architecture. It only needs a key distribution module to be added to the TA during
the system initialization.
• The complementing mechanisms are suitable for not only VANETs but also any type
of networks employing PKI.
• Algorithms 6-8 are executed through the HSM module in each OBU.
5.7 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed complementing mechanisms of PKI
against some common attacks.
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Resistance to forging attacks
To forge the revocation check REVcheck = HMAC (Kg,PIDu || Tstamp) of any OBUu , an
attacker has to find the current Kg, which is equivalent to finding t in the following ECDLP





P and K+M =
1
kM
P , find t such that Kim = tK
+
M .
Similar analogy applies to finding the TA secret key s from the TA message signature
sgnKmsg = sH(Kmsg). Since ECDLP is a hard computational problem [40], i.e., it cannot
be solved in a sub-exponential time, the revocation check and the TA message signature
sgnKmsg are unforgeable. Similarly, finding the TA secret value s from P◦ = sP is ECDLP
problem, which makes it unforgeable. From the aforementioned discussion, it is concluded
that EMAP is resistant to forging attacks.
Resistance to replay attacks
Since in each message an OBU includes the current time stamp in the revocation check value
REVcheck = HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp), an attacker cannot record REVcheck at time Ti and
replay it at a later time Ti+1 to pass the revocation checking process as the receiving OBU
compares the current time Ti+1 with that included in the revocation check. Consequently,
EMAP is secure against replay attacks.
Forward secrecy
Since the values of the hash chain included in the revocation messages are released to non-
revoked OBUs starting from the last value of the hash chain, and given the fact that a hash
function is irreversible, a revoked OBU cannot use a hash chain value vj−ver+1 received in
a previous revocation process to get the current hash chain value vj−ver. Consequently,
a revoked OBU cannot update its secret key set (RS ). Accordingly, a revoked OBU can
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neither get K−M necessary to independently calculate the new secret key K̃g nor get K̃g
from the neighboring OBUs since the certificates of the revoked OBUs are in the up-to-
date CRL which prevents unrevoked OBUs from forwarding K̃g to the revoked OBUs. As
a result, the proposed complemented PKI guarantees forward secrecy.
Resistance to colluding attacks
For a colluding attack, a legitimate OBU colludes with a revoked OBU by releasing the
current secret group key K̃g such that the revoked vehicle can use this key to pass the revo-
cation check process by calculating the correct HMAC values for the transmitted messages.
All the security materials of an OBU are stored in its tamper-resistant HSM. In addition,
all the keys update processes in Algorithms 6-8 are executed in the HSM, which means
that the new secret group key K̃g is stored in the HSM, and it cannot be transmitted in
clear under any circumstances. Note that in Algorithm 7 step (7) the HSM only sends
K̃g encrypted with the public key included in the certificate of the OBU requesting K̃g
after checking that the certificate of that OBU is not in the CRL. Accordingly, only that
OBU is the entity that can decrypt and obtain K̃g using its secret key which is exclusively
known to itself. Since it is infeasible to extract the security materials from the tamper-
resistant HSM, an unrevoked OBU cannot collude with a revoked OBU by passing the
new secret group key K̃g to the revoked OBU. Hence, the proposed complemented PKI is
secure against colluding attacks.
5.8 Performance Evaluation




5.8.1 Computation Complexity of Revocation Status Checking
We are interested in the computation complexity of the revocation status checking process
which is defined as the number of comparison operations required to check the revocation
status of an OBU. Let Nrev denote the total number of revoked certificates in a CRL. To
check the revocation status of an OBUu using the linear search algorithm, an entity has to
compare the certificate identity of OBUu with every certificate of the Nrev certificates in the
CRL, i.e., the entity performs one-to-one checking process. Consequently, the computation
complexity of employing the linear search algorithm to perform a revocation status checking
for an OBU is O(Nrev). In the binary search algorithm, the certificate identity of OBUu
is compared to the certificate identity in the middle of the sorted CRL. If the certificate
identity of OBUu is greater than that of the entry in the middle, then half of the CRL
with identities lower than that of OBUu are discarded from the upcoming comparisons. If
the certificate identity of OBUu is lower than that of the entry in the middle, then half
of the CRL with identities higher than that of OBUu are discarded. The checking process
is repeated until a match is found or the CRL is finished. It can be seen that at each
step in the binary search method half of the entries considered in the search is discarded.
Thus, the computation complexity of the binary search algorithm to perform a revocation
status checking for an OBU is O(logNrev) [66]. In EMAP, the revocation checking process
requires only one comparison between the calculated and received values of REVcheck. As
a result, the computation complexity of EMAP is O(1), which is constant and independent
of the number of revoked certificates. In other words, EMAP has the lowest computation
complexity compared with the CRL checking processes employing linear and binary search
algorithms.
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5.8.2 Authentication Delay
We compare the message authentication delay employing the CRL with that employing
EMAP to check the revocation status of an OBU. As stated earlier, the authentication of
any message is performed by three consecutive phases: checking the sender’s revocation
status, verifying the sender’s certificate, and verifying the sender’s signature. For the first
authentication phase which checks the revocation status of the sender, we employ either
the CRL or EMAP. For EMAP, we adopt the Cipher Block Chaining Advanced Encryption
Standard (CBC-HMAC AES) [67] and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 SHA-1 [68] as the HMAC
functions. We consider the pseudo identity (PID) of OBU and the time stamp (Tstamp)
having equal lengths of 8 bytes. We adopt the Crypto++ library [69] for calculating the
delay of the HMAC functions, where it is compiled on Intel Core2Duo 2 GHz machine. The
delay incurred by using CBC-HMAC AES and SHA-1 to calculate the revocation check
(REVcheck = HMAC (Kg,PIDu ||Tstamp)) is 0.23 µsec and 0.42 µsec, respectively. Also, we
have simulated the linear and binary CRL checking process using C++ programs compiled
on the same machine. The linear CRL checking program performs progressive search on a
text file containing the unsorted identities of the revoked certificates, while the binary CRL
checking program performs a binary search on a text file containing the sorted identities of
the revoked certificates. For the second and third authentication phases, we employ Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [51] to check the authenticity of the certificate
and the signature of the sender. ECDSA is the digital signature method chosen by the
WAVE standard. In ECDSA, a signature verification takes 2Tmul, where Tmul denotes the
time required to perform a point multiplication on an elliptic curve. Consequently, the
verification of a certificate and message signature takes 4Tmul. In [26], Tmul is found for a
supersingular curve with embedding degree k = 6 to be equal to 0.6 msec.
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Auth. with CRL (linear)
Auth. with CRL (binary)
Auth. with EMAP (SHA−1)
Auth. with EMAP (CBC−HMAC AES)
Figure 5.4: Authentication delay per message
Fig. 5.4 shows a comparison between the authentication delay per message using
EMAP, linear CRL checking process, and binary CRL checking process vs. the number of
the revoked certificates, where the number of the revoked certificates is an indication of
the CRL size. It can be seen that the authentication delay using the linear CRL checking
process increases with the number of revoked certificates, i.e., with the size of the CRL.
Also, the authentication delay using the binary CRL checking process is almost constant.
This can be explained as follows: the number of revoked certificates in the conducted sim-
ulation ranges from 10000 to 50000 revoked certificates; This is respectively corresponding
to 14 to 16 comparison operations. Since the range of the number of the comparison oper-
ations is very small, the authentication delay is almost constant. The authentication delay
using EMAP is constant and independent of the number of revoked certificates. Moreover,
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Auth. with CRL (linear, 20000 cert.)
Auth. with CRL (linear, 50000 cert.)
Auth. with CRL (binary, 20000 cert.)
Auth. with CRL (binary, 50000 cert.)
Auth. with EMAP (SHA−1)
Auth. with EMAP (CBC−HMAC AES)
Figure 5.5: Total authentication delay vs. the number of the received messages
the authentication delay using EMAP outperforms that using the linear and binary CRL
checking processes. For example, the authentication delay per message using the linear
CRL checking process, the binary CRL checking process, and EMAP (SHA-1) for a CRL
including 20000 revoked certificates are 21.4 msec, 4.62 msec, and 2.4004 msec, respec-
tively. Consequently, EMAP (SHA-1) expedites the message authentication by 88.78%
and 48.04% compared to that using the linear and binary CRL checking processes, respec-
tively. Fig. 5.5 shows the total authentication delay in msec vs. the number of messages
to be authenticated using EMAP and the linear and binary CRL checking processes. It
can be seen that as the CRL size increases the number of messages that can be verified
within a specific period is significantly decreased using the linear CRL checking process.
Also, for a constant authentication delay, EMAP outperforms the linear and binary CRL
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Figure 5.6: A city street simulation scenario
checking processes. The maximum number of messages that can be verified simultane-
ously in 300 msec is 14, 64, and 124 messages for message authentication employing linear
CRL checking, binary CRL checking, and EMAP, respectively, where the considered CRL
includes 20, 000 certificates. The number of messages that can be verified using EMAP
within 300 msec is greater than that using linear and binary CRL checking by 88.7% and
48.38%, respectively.
5.8.3 End-to-end delay
To further evaluate EMAP, we have conducted ns-2 [47] simulation for the city street
scenario shown in Fig. 5.6. The adopted simulation parameters are given in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: NS-2 simulation parameters for the proposed complemented PKI
Simulation area 7.4 Km× 7.4 Km
Simulation time 30 sec
Max. OBU speed 60 Km/h
OBU transmission range 300 m
OBU information dissemination interval 300 msec
MAC protocol 802.11a
Wireless channel capacity 6 Mbps
























Auth. with CRL (linear, 30000 cert.)
Auth. with CRL (linear, 20000 cert.)
Auth. with CRL (binary, 30000 cert.)
Auth. with CRL (binary, 20000 cert.)
Auth. with EMAP
Figure 5.7: End-to-end delay vs. OBUs density
We select the dissemination of the road condition information by an OBU every 300 msec
to conform with the DSRC standards. The mobility traces adopted in this simulation are
generated using TraNS [48]. We are interested in the end-to-end delay, which is defined as
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the time to transmit a message from the sender to the receiver. Fig. 5.7 shows the end-to-
end delay in msec vs. the OBUs density, by employing authentication using the proposed
EMAP (SHA-1), the linear CRL checking, and binary CRL checking, respectively. In the
simulation, we consider CRLs containing 20000 and 30000 revoked certificates, respectively,
and the OBUs density as the number of OBUs per km2. It can be seen that the end-to-
end delay increases with the OBUs density because the number of the received packets
increases with the OBUs density resulting in longer waiting time for the packets to be
processed by the application layer in each OBU. In addition, the end-to-end delay tends
to be constant for high OBUs densities as the number of received packets reaches the
maximum number of packets an OBU can verify within a specific duration. The end-to-
end delay also increases with the number of revoked certificates included in the CRL for
the linear CRL checking process. However, the end-to-end delay is almost constant with
the CRL size using the binary checking process as the number of comparison operations
needed to check CRLs with 20000 and 30000 certificates is almost the same. From Fig. 5.7,
employing the proposed EMAP in authentication reduces the end-to-end delay compared
with that using either the linear or the binary CRL checking process.
5.8.4 Message Loss Ratio
The average message loss ratio is defined as the average ratio between the number of
messages dropped every 300 msec, due to the message authentication delay, and the total
number of messages received every 300msec by an OBU. It should be noted that we are only
interested in the message loss incurred by OBUs due to V2V communications. According
to DSRC, each OBU has to disseminate a message containing information about the road
condition every 300 msec. In order to react properly and instantly to the varying road
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conditions, each OBU should verify the messages received during the last 300 msec before
disseminating a new message about the road condition. Therefore, we chose to measure
the message loss ratio every 300 msec. Fig. 5.8 shows the analytical and simulated average
message loss ratio vs. the average number of OBUs within the communication range of each
OBU for message authentication employing CRL linear checking, CRL binary checking,
and EMAP, respectively, for a CRL containing 20, 000 certificates. It can be seen that
the simulated average message loss ratio closely follows the analytical message loss ratio
which is calculated based on the maximum number of messages that can be authenticated
within 300 msec. The difference between the analytical and simulations results stems from
observing that some zones in the simulated area become more congested than other zones,
thus, some OBUs experience higher message loss than other OBUs, which leads to that
difference between the analytical and simulations results. It can also be seen that the
message loss ratio increases with the number of OBUs within communication range for
all the protocols under considerations. In addition, the message authentication employing
EMAP significantly decreases the message loss ratio compared to that employing either the
linear or binary CRL revocation status checking. The reason of the superiority of EMAP
is that it incurs the minimum revocation status checking delay compared to the linear and
binary CRL revocation checking processes.
5.8.5 Communication Overhead
In EMAP, each OBUu broadcasts a signed message on the form (M||Tstamp|| certu(PIDu ,
PK u, sigTA(PIDu ||PKu))||sigu(M||Tstamp)||REVcheck) to its neighboring OBUs. A signed
message in the WAVE standard should include the certificate of the sender, a time stamp,
and the signature of the sender on the transmitted message. Consequently, the additional
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Figure 5.8: Comparison between message loss ratio for different schemes
communication overhead incurred in EMAP compared to that in the WAVE standard is
mainly due to REVcheck. The length of REVcheck depends on the employed hash func-
tion. For example, when SHA-1 is employed in EMAP for calculating REVcheck, this is
corresponding to an additional overhead of 20 bytes [68]. The total overhead incurred in a
signed message in the WAVE standard is 181 bytes [2]. Consequently, the total overhead
in EMAP (SHA-1), assuming the same message format of the WAVE standard, is 201
bytes. In WAVE [2], the maximum payload data size in a signed message is 65.6 Kbytes.
Accordingly, the ratio of the communication overhead in a signed message to the payload
data size is 0.28% and 0.31% for the WAVE standard and EMAP, respectively. EMAP
incurs 0.03% increase in the communication overhead compared to the WAVE standard,
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Tx cost (low density, T1=50 msec)
Rx cost (low density, T1=50 msec)
Tx cost (high density, T1=150 msec)
Rx cost (high density, T1=150 msec)
Figure 5.9: Communication cost of updating Kg
which is acceptable with respect to the gained benefits from EMAP.
5.8.6 Communication Cost of Updating the Secret Group Key
(Kg)
We are interested in the communication cost of updating the secret group key (Kg), which
is the average number of messages an OBU has to transmit and receive after triggering the
revocation process to get the new secret group key (K̃g) and distribute K̃g to its unrevoked
neighboring OBUs. We have conducted ns-2 [47] simulation for the city street scenario
shown in Fig. 5.6, for two scenarios: low and high OBUs densities corresponding to OBUs
densities of 32.5 /km2 and 91.5 /km2, respectively. We use the same simulation parameters
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given in Table 5.1. We select the dissemination of the road condition information by an
OBU every 300 msec to conform with the DSRC standards. We consider the TA having
a key pool of size l = 10000, and each OBU having a key set of size m = 100. In the
proposed complemented PKI, an OBUy not having K
−
M will send a request message to its
neighboring OBUs to get the new secret group key (K̃g) and start timer T1, where OBUy
will retry to get K̃g if T1 is expired before getting K̃g. In the conducted simulation, we set
T1 to be 50 msec and 150 msec for the low and high OBUs densities, respectively. Also,
we only consider the case that an OBU without K−M , can get the new secret group key K̃g
from another OBU through a single hop.
Initially, the percentage of OBUs having the key K−M is 1.97% and 1.56% for the low and
high OBUs densities, respectively. After the broadcast of the revocation message REVmsg,
only the OBUs having K−M are able to independently calculate the new secret group key K̃g,
and they will deliver K̃g to other OBUs through V2V communication. Fig. 5.9 shows the
average communications cost vs. the number of simultaneously revoked OBUs. It can be
seen that in each scenario, the communication cost (transmit or receive) is almost constant
with respect to the number of simultaneously revoked OBUs. This is due to the fact that
revoking the key sets of the revoked OBUs does not revoke the key K−M which is shared by
the majority of OBUs. Consequently, the percentage of OBUs initially having K−M will not
change. It can be seen that the communication cost is equal with respect to the number
of received messages in both low and high OBUs densities. Also, the communication cost
of the transmitted messages is higher than that of the received messages. This is due to
the fact that a request broadcast by an OBUy to get the new secret group key (K̃g) is
received by all the neighboring OBUs, and each OBU of the neighboring OBUs will send
K̃g to OBUy. As a result, a number of OBUs, requesting K̃g, in some geographic area,
will cause all the neighboring OBUs to broadcast K̃g as many times as the number of
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Figure 5.10: Incurred delay to obtain K̃g
OBUs requesting K̃g in that area. We have tried several values for the timer T1, and the
considered values for T1 give the best results. If we select smaller T1, the transmission cost
will increase since each OBU not having K−M will send requests to get K̃g at a higher rate,
and hence, more replies will be transmitted by the OBUs. It can also be seen that the low
OBU density scenario incurs lower transmission communication cost than the high OBU
density scenario since the number of OBUs in the low density scenario is lower than that
in the high OBU density scenario.
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Table 5.2: Simulation parameters for REP
Simulation parameter Highway model Manhattan model
road length (km) 3 3x3
arrival rate (/msec) 0.01 0.012
OBUs speed(km/h) 80 50
simulation time (min) 4 6
5.8.7 Incurred Delay to Obtain the New Secret Group Key (K̃g)
We are interested in the average delay for an OBU without K−M to get the new secret group
key K̃g from its neighboring OBUs after the revocation message REVmsg is delivered to all
the OBUs in the simulated area. We conducted ns-2 simulation for the low and high OBUs
densities scenarios considered in the previous subsection. Initially, the percentage of OBUs
having the key K−M , and capable of independently calculating K̃g, is 1.97% and 1.56% for
the low and high OBUs densities scenarios, respectively. Fig. 5.10 shows the average delay
in msec, incurred by an OBU from the moment the revocation message REVmsg is received
by all the OBUs in the simulated area until it gets the new secret group key K̃g, vs. the
number of simultaneously revoked OBUs. It can be seen that the incurred delay to get K̃g
is confined to a small range in each scenario. Also, the delay of obtaining K̃g in the high
OBU density scenario is higher than that in the low OBU density scenario as the value of
T1 in the high OBU density scenario is higher than that in the low OBU density scenario.
However, for both low and high OBU densities, the delay of getting K̃g is less than 1 sec,
which indicates that the proposed complemented PKI is feasible and reliable.
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Figure 5.11: Manhattan road model
5.8.8 Anonymity Set Size
In this section, we evaluate the achieved anonymity set size under REP. We simulate a
highway and Manhattan mobility models using Matlab. The simulation parameters are
given in Table. 5.2. In each mobility model, OBUs arrive according to a Poisson random
process, where the arriving OBU randomly selects an entry port from predefined entry
ports. When an OBU reaches one of the output entries, it disappears. The highway model
consists of 6 lanes (3 in each direction). For the Manhattan mobility model shown in Fig.
5.11, each street consists of 4 lanes (2 in each direction). At each intersection, each OBU
has a probability of 25% to turn right or left.
We use the highway and Manhattan mobility models to investigate the achieved average
anonymity set size using REP. Each OBU has a probability of 0.05% to change its certificate
every 300 msec. Also, we consider that the criteria to terminate the encryption period is
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Figure 5.12: The average anonymity set size for highway mobility model
that the anonymity set size is greater than one. Figs. 5.12-5.17 show the average anonymity
set size, the average REP duration, and the ratio between the number of anonymity sets
of different sizes to the total number of anonymity sets for the highway and Manhattan
mobility models, respectively. In Figs. 5.12-5.13, we compare the average anonymity set
size with and without REP. Also, we simulate REP for three cases corresponding to initial
TREP values of 300 msec, 400 msec, and 500 msec, respectively. It can be seen that without
using REP (which is the current normal mode of VANETs), the average anonymity set
size is one since the global observer can capture all the broadcast messages. As a result,
the location privacy of drivers is vulnerable to the tracking attack previously discussed.
In addition, it can be seen that with using REP, the average anonymity set size is always
greater than two, which decreases the probability of being tracked by a global observer.
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Figure 5.13: The average anonymity set size for Manhattan mobility model
It can be seen from Figs. 5.14-5.15 that the average REP duration for the Manhattan
model is higher than that for the highway model as the OBUs density in the Manhattan
model is less than that for the highway model. The reason can be explained as follows.
First, although the arrival rate for the Manhattan model is higher than that for the highway
model, the arriving OBUs are distributed between 6 streets (4 lanes each, i.e., 24 lanes)
for the Manhattan model, while the arriving OBUs are distributed between 6 lanes in
the highway model. Second, the simulation area for the Manhattan model is larger than
that for the highway model. From the aforementioned explanation, the OBUs density in
the Manhattan model is lower than that in the highway model. Hence, the OBUs in the
Manhattan model needs more time to have anonymity set size greater than one.
161
5.8. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION



































Figure 5.14: The average REP duration for highway mobility model
Figs. 5.16-5.17 show the ratio between the anonymity sets of different sizes and the total
number of anonymity sets. For both Manhattan model and highway model, it can be seen
that without using REP, the anonymity sets of size one are 100% of the total anonymity
sets. In addition, when using REP in the highway model, the ratio of the anonymity sets
of size greater than one are 100%. For the Manhattan model, when using REP, 98.24% of
the total anonymity sets achieves set size greater than one, while 1.76% of the anonymity
sets are still having size one by the end of the simulation time.
Since the random silent periods proposed by Sampigethaya et al. [7] only considers
location privacy for non-safety applications in vehicular networks, and REP is mainly used
for providing location privacy for safety applications, the only work that can be compared
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Figure 5.15: The average REP duration for Manhattan mobility model
to REP is the Cryptographic MIX-zones (CMIXes) approach [33]. In addition, the authors
of CMIXes demonstrate that CMIXes can be applied in a city scenario with the help
of RSUs at some selected intersection, however, they do not explain how CMIXes can
be applied in a highway scenario. Hence, we only consider CMIXes in the Manhattan
model. In the conducted simulation for CMIXes, we consider that there is an RSU with
a coverage area of 300 m [3] at each intersection. In addition, when an OBUi enters the
coverage area of an RSUj at an intersection, it is forced to change its certificate according
to [33]. Moreover, we consider all the OBUs within the coverage area of RSUj to be in the
anonymity set of OBUi. When OBUi leaves the coverage area of RSUj, the anonymity
set corresponding to OBUi is terminated, and a new anonymity set is generated at RSUj
for the first OBU enters the coverage area of RSUj. Fig. 5.17 shows a comparison of
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Figure 5.16: The impact of REP on the anonymity set size for highway mobility model
the ratio between the anonymity sets of different sizes and the total number of anonymity
sets in the Manhattan model for the case without and with REP, and with CMIXes. It
can be seen that for CMIXes, only 25.42% of the total anonymity sets achieves set size
greater than one, while 74.58% of the anonymity sets are still having size one by the end of
the simulation time, which clearly indicates that the proposed REP protocol outperforms
CMIXes. Another advantage of the REP scheme is that it does not rely on the existence
of RSUs compared to CMIXes. Therefore, REP is more suitable for the early deployment
stage of VANETs where the RSUs will be sparsely distributed.
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Figure 5.17: The impact of REP on the anonymity set size for Manhattan mobility model
5.9 Complementing DCS with EMAP and REP
The DCS scheme presented in Chapter 3 can be complemented with EMAP and REP as
follows.
• During the system initialization in the DCS scheme, the MA generates a secret key
pool, calculates the corresponding public keys as indicated in subsection 5.3.2, and
selects a secret group key Kg. It should be noted that the key pool for complementing
DCS is different from that required to integrate EDR with DCS, i.e., each CA will




• The MA copies the key pool, the corresponding public keys, and the secret group
key Kg in each CA.
• During the initialization of the OBUs, each OBU randomly selects m secret keys,
their corresponding public keys from the key pool of its in charge CA. Also, the CA
loads the secret group key Kg in each OBU.
• Whenever an OBU or RSU wants to sign a message, it generates the signature on the
message as indicated in subsection 3.5.1, and then calculates the revocation check as
indicated in subsection 5.4.1.
• Whenever an OBU wants to change its current certificate, it employs REP as indi-
cated in subsection 5.5.1 to preserve its location privacy.
• When a CA initiates a rekeying process, it proceeds as indicated in Algorithm 5.6,
and sends the revocation version ver to the MA. The MA, broadcasts ver to all the
CAs such that when a rekeying process is performed in another CA, this CA should
consider ver + 1 as its revocation version. Since the key pool is the same in each
CA and the future revocation version is always incremental compared to the current
revocation version experienced by the OBUs, the OBUs can roam between different
domains and still be able to use EMAP, REP, and update its randomly selected keys.
5.10 Summary
In this Chapter, we have proposed complemented PKI, which employs a probabilistic key
distribution to establish a shared secret group key between the group members. The
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proposed complemented PKI expedites message authentication by replacing the time-
consuming CRL checking process with a fast revocation checking process employing HMAC
function. The expedite message authentication (EMAP) can significantly decrease the
message loss ratio due to message verification delay compared to the conventional authen-
tication methods employing CRL checking. In addition, the proposed complemented PKI
provides location privacy for VANETs using random encryption periods (REP). For an
OBU changing its certificate, REP triggers encryption zone around the OBU to violate
the conditions required to launch a tracking attack, and it creates an ambiguity to any
external observer. Extensive analysis and evaluation of the proposed complemented PKI
have been performed to demonstrate its reliability and security. Moreover, the proposed
complementing mechanisms (EMAP and REP) have modular natures which enable their
integration with any PKI, e.g., the DCS scheme presented in Chapter 3.
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Conclusions and Future Work
In this Chapter, we present our conclusions and outline our future research directions.
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have proposed a set of protocols to provide security and privacy preser-
vation for VANETs. Our results have shown that the proposed protocols can achieve the
targeted security and privacy preservation requirements. In addition, the detailed per-
formance evaluation and security analysis have indicated that the proposed protocols are
secure and efficient. The achievements accomplished in this thesis can be summarized as
follows.
• In Chapter 2, we surveyed the state of the art in security and privacy preservation
in VANETs. We have identified the challenges for securing VANETs by discussing
security threats and requirements in VANETs. Moreover, we have detailed the neces-
sary security mechanisms to achieve anonymous authentication and location privacy
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for preserving the users’ privacy in VANETs. In addition, we have described the
different revocation mechanisms in VANETs.
• In Chapter 3, we have proposed an efficient distributed certificate service (DCS)
scheme for vehicular communications, which offers a flexible interoperability to avoid
the key escrow issue in different administrative authorities and an efficient distributed
algorithm for any OBU to update or revoke its certificate from the available RSUs
in a timely manner. In addition, with the batch verification, the entities in the DCS
scheme can rapidly verify a mass of message signatures and certificates simultane-
ously. Therefore, the proposed DCS scheme can significantly reduce the complexity
of certificate management, and achieve excellent efficiency and scalability, especially
when it is deployed in heterogeneous vehicular networks.
• In Chapter 4, we have proposed a robust and efficient decentralized revocation (EDR)
protocol for VANETs, which substantially reduces the complexity of the certificate
revocation problem, while achieving fast revocation of the misbehaving vehicles. The
EDR protocol decreases the vulnerability window that a misbehaving vehicle has
resulting in higher safety level for VANET. The EDR protocol is resistant to the
most known revocation attacks. In addition, it can be efficiently integrated with any
PKI and/or any misbehavior detection scheme for VANETs.
• In Chapter 5, we have proposed complemented PKI, which employs a probabilistic
key distribution to establish a shared secret group key between the group members.
The proposed complemented PKI expedites message authentication by replacing the
time-consuming CRL checking process with a fast revocation checking process em-
ploying HMAC function. The expedite message authentication (EMAP) can signif-
icantly decrease the message loss ratio due to message verification delay compared
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to the conventional authentication methods employing CRL checking. In addition,
the proposed complemented PKI provides location privacy for VANETs using ran-
dom encryption periods (REP). For an OBU changing its certificate, REP triggers
encryption zone around the OBU to violate the conditions required to launch a
tracking attack, and it creates an ambiguity to any external observer. Extensive
analysis and evaluation of the proposed complemented PKI have been performed
to demonstrate its reliability and security. Moreover, the proposed complementing
mechanisms (EMAP and REP) have modular natures which enable their integration
with any PKI, e.g., the DCS scheme presented in Chapter 3.
6.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we have proposed a set of security protocols that can achieve reliable and
secure vehicular communications. Although the achievements accomplished in this thesis,
the research done in the thesis can only provide the security requirements necessary for
deploying the basic VANET applications and there still many open research areas that
should be tackled. In the following subsections, we indicate our future work.
6.2.1 Reputation-Based Scheme for VANETs
In decentralized reputation-based schemes, each node assigns a reputation value for each
neighboring node based on the received messages from the other nodes. The applications of
reputation-based schemes in VANETs are very promising [70]. For example, a reputation-
based scheme can be used to complement the secure routing in VANETs to help a vehicle
in selecting the most reliable forwarder available among its neighboring vehicles. Also, a
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reputation-based scheme can be used to check the consistency of the received data. In
safety applications, e.g., lane change assistance, if the consistency of the received message
cannot be guaranteed, the vehicles receiving this message can be subject to fatal actions.
It is expected that anonymous authentication will be employed in VANETs [2], where
vehicle periodically changes its identity to preserve its privacy. Consequently, deploying a
reputation-based scheme in VANETs will be very challenging. We believe that the main
challenge is how to link the reputation of a vehicle to its periodically changing identities. In
the future, we will propose a reputation-based scheme suitable for VANETs. In addition,
we are going to explore the different VANET applications that reputation-based schemes
can be used in to enhance their security.
6.2.2 Privacy-Preservation in Position-Based Routing in VANETs
Position-based routing schemes requires the vehicles to periodically reveal their locations
in order to properly route the messages between the source and the destination. This
requirement violates the location privacy of the users and it may be the cause that users
abstain from using the multi-hop applications in VANETs. Preserving the location privacy
in position-based routing protocols is an open research topic. The main challenge in this
research topic is how to route the messages between the source and the destination without
revealing their exact locations. In our future work, we are going to investigate how to solve
this problem.
6.2.3 Integrating Electronic Health With Vehicular Networks
In emergency situation such as accidents, health records are needed on the spot to provide
the necessary medical care, which may be essential to save lives. Through personal health
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records, electronic health (ehealth) can provide this medical service on the roads [71]. On
the other hand, body area network is a set of sensors mounted on the body of the patient
to monitor his/her health conditions. To enable the aforementioned medical service on
the road, ehealth and body area network should be integrated with location based routing
in VANET. Such integration is very important for providing health reports in case of
accidents. Also, vehicles can display warning messages for the drivers in case their blood
pressure, blood sugar level, etc., reach a dangerous level. In our future work, we need to
investigate this open research area.
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